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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM

US PSYWAR OPERATIONS
IN THE KOREAN WAR

BY

GEORGE S. PETTEE

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Technical Memorandum

US PSYWAR OPERATIONS IN THE KOREAN WAR

by

George S. Pettee

Operations Research Office
The Johns Hopkins University
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington 25, D.C.

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
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SUMMARY

PROBLEM:

1. To assess the actual past operations and effectiveness of US military psychological warfare in the Korean War, and the possible means of gaining increased effect.

FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS:

2. Psywar readiness measures in the Far East Theatre before 25 June 1950 consisted of planning only.

3. Strategic psywar measures produce effects, in long-run statistical terms, that have considerable strategic value; positive tactical effects on the other hand are to be gained in proportion to the use of strictly tactical psywar methods.

4. Recent changes in the war situation and in the world political situation afford a basis for a fresh consideration of the premises upon which US psywar in relation to Korea is based.

5. A more extended commitment and a military effort on a larger scale and for a longer time, afford an opportunity, and set a requirement, for expanded psywar activities.

DISCUSSION:

Past Performance

6. Leaflet production has amounted to about 160,000,000 copies; there have been more than 100 different kinds of leaflets.

7. Nine-tenths, approximately, of all leaflets distributed have been delivered by strategic aircraft.

8. About one-tenth of all leaflets have been delivered by artillery shell or by local aircraft, including organic liaison planes and Air Force planes under forward tactical control.

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9. About one type in ten of the different types of leaflets produced was produced in Korea by authority of the Psychological Warfare Branch, for special purposes requiring rapid action.

10. Only two trailer-mounted loudspeakers, and two air-borne local speakers, have seen service in Korea in psywar operations.

11. Projects using trailer and air-borne speakers have been hampered by lack of spare parts for the equipment and by technical imperfections.

12. Loudspeakers have demonstrated their value in specific instances.

13. Only two posters have been produced by PWB. Plans for a larger poster operation were set aside in December because of the change in the war situation.

14. Radio from Japan has supplied daily one and one-half hours of produced programs and about 25 hours of broadcasting by relay, over several Japanese transmitters, in the Korean language.

15. In addition to the radio program from Japan, Korean stations have been operated at Seoul and Pyongyang, with up to nine hours per day of program over the Seoul station. Since the loss of Seoul and Pyongyang a network of seven stations in South Korea has been taken over for the psywar program.

16. A detachment was sent from the ZI in September 1950, to become the nucleus of a First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, which was activated on 4 November. This Company met with such difficulties in procuring its full complement of personnel and equipment that it was not yet operative at the end of the year.

17. Policy guidance has had to tread a narrow course in order to attack Communist aggression while avoiding any tendency to provoke or commit the Chinese Communist Government or the Soviet Government. A number of prohibitions that were in effect at the start of operations have been removed from time to time as the situation has developed.

18. Intelligence for psywar has been initiated by the few available personnel. Regular intelligence services have also attempted to serve psywar when requested and within means available. The provision for this function is especially inadequate up to the present, and the

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resources available are largely occupied with required reports that serve higher authorities but give no direct service to psywar operations.

19. Research for psywar, to provide summary data on enemy culture, morale, issues, idiom, personalities, etcetera, has barely been initiated. The large volume of bulk intelligence and basic reference materials available, containing pertinent information and data, makes research a requirement for any large scale psywar program.

20. Liaison work, and indoctrination, are required on a considerable scale because psywar operations require the participation of large numbers of persons in other branches and services. Such liaison has not been possible hitherto on an intensive scale below corps level because of shortage of personnel.

Evaluation

21. The interrogation of prisoners of war has been the main source of evidence as to the results gained by psywar.

22. Such interrogation, unless conducted with great technical skill, produces only dubious and approximate indications of the effects gained.

23. Interrogations conducted in the past, though they must be accepted with caution, indicate that substantial results have been gained.

24. Actual incidents are known in which the results of psywar operations were direct and positive.

25. The enemy has shown, by his own emphasis on psywar, by specific imitation of US methods so far as his resources permit, and by his strenuous counter-measures, that he takes psywar seriously.

26. The general indication from all evidence is that psywar produces greater results in relation to cost than the average of all weapons.

ROK Psywar

27. The conduct of psywar by the ROK has been primarily concerned with activities relating to public information, addressed almost entirely to the ROK forces and to civilians in areas under ROK or UN control.

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28. Within this limitation, ROK psywar has been energetic and varied.

Enemy Psywar

29. Enemy psywar has been intensive, but has been very largely non-tactical.

30. Enemy psywar uses posters and other media in great variety and with high skill in areas under enemy control.

31. Agitation is the primary instrument of enemy psywar. This requires the use of individuals, including party members, for active work as promoters, organizers, talkers, in a grass-roots approach to the popular audience. It has been largely eliminated in ROK or UN controlled areas but remains the chief instrument for developing popular support, or the appearance of such support, in enemy controlled areas.

32. The enemy in November 1950, conducted a small-scale leaflet operation by air drop, modeling the leaflets on the US type.

33. By-passed enemy groups conduct psywar activities in addition to other missions, when the enemy is advancing toward the areas where they can expect to operate successfully.

Further Development of US Psywar for the Korean War

34. The audience to be addressed, both military and civilian, affords good prospects for solid results in all levels of psywar, political warfare, strategic psychological warfare, and tactical psychological warfare.

35. Political warfare in the Far East has been hampered in the past few years by confusion as to the political situation. It has also had to await further developments in the structure of US policy. A stage has now been reached which is far more favorable for political warfare than any in the last few years.

36. Strategic psywar would be greatly facilitated if policy arrangements could be laid down that would permit a positive propaganda line on the benefits of UN victory.

37. Tactical psywar, carried with precision in theme and timing to precise audiences in precise situations, which then may be called micro-psywar, would have very

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substantial opportunities in the Korean War.

38. Micro-psywar can find good opportunities even when the general military situation is unfavorable.

39. For effective tactical or micro-psywar, the prime requirement is that the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company be made fully operative.

40. Tactical psywar also requires full attention to several other requirements, including specific psywar skill, language skill, and intensive liaison and indoctrination activities.

41. In order that all the requirements may be met, tactical psywar must have strong organizational status and solid staff support.

42. The strategic psywar effort can be continued and expanded.

43. The radio effort of the US psywar program up to the present has been very small compared to the enemy-controlled radio propaganda effort addressed to the Far East.

44. The total leaflet effort thus far is small when compared to the numbers of leaflets produced in such a campaign as that in the Phillipines in the last war.

CONCLUSIONS:

45. On 25 June 1950, there were no readiness measures in terms of operating personnel or equipment for psywar on hand in the Far East Theatre; there were only plans.

46. Since 25 June the psywar planning group has grown into a psywar operating group. Up to this time it has been able only to meet emergency demands on a provisional basis. It has never been given resources enough to catch up with the workload which has been thrust upon it in ever increasing volume. The psywar requirement has always grown first, and the psywar authorization thereafter, up to the present stage. Reasonable assumptions about the future war situation indicate that the psywar organization should be strengthened, not only up to the level of present demands, but beyond them in readiness for still greater demands.

47. The provision of trained, experienced and competent psywar personnel from the ZI has been far from adequate. It has not provided men properly fitted for

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specific jobs on any systematic basis.

48. The orientation of psywar activity has been primarily along the lines of strategic psywar.

49. The orientation toward strategic psywar was required by the state of affairs as to personnel, equipment and other factors, which made strategic psywar far more feasible in the first six months of the war than tactical psywar at that time.

50. The orientation of psywar, and psywar policy, has been restricted by national policy at many points, especially in connection with such matters as Chinese intervention in Korea.

51. Psywar intelligence has thus far been developed more on the side of intelligence about psywar than on the side of intelligence for psywar.

52. Because of the constant necessity thus far to "make bricks without straw" and the much greater availability of strategic means than of tactical means, the content themes have been generally strategic.

53. Research on the enemy audience and enemy conditions is required on a substantial scale, and it has not been possible to establish it up to the present.

54. The physical production of leaflets has been adequate for strategic purposes only. The physical production of radio programs has been on a small scale in Tokyo, and a somewhat larger scale in Korea. The present radio production program in Korea has available only low-power transmitters. The production of tactical psywar materials in Korea has been very small, either for leaflets or for loudspeaker activities.

55. The dissemination of leaflets has been very largely by B-29 planes. Dissemination by plane should be continued, but neither the type of plane nor the type of bomb used are the most satisfactory instruments for the purpose. Their utilization was justified by the fact that they were available, and no alternative was available.

56. Considering the weight and bulk of the leaflets, there appears to be no reason why a far more economical and effective method for strategic leaflet drops cannot be devised for future use.

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57. The methods of dropping leaflets by air for tactical purposes have been improvised, using organic liaison aircraft and also T-6, P4U and C-47 planes. There has not been any operational use of a special means for discharging of leaflets from the plane.

58. The dissemination of leaflets by artillery shell has been used on occasion, but has apparently fallen into disuse because of insufficient indoctrination of all concerned as to its advantages, and because of the disruption of arrangements for such use arising out of major changes in the combat situation.

59. The dissemination of psywar material through combat loudspeakers, both airborne and ground, has been conducted on what amounts to an experimental scale. Present equipment has not proved wholly satisfactory, spare parts have been lacking, and operability in extreme cold has been poor.

60. Liaison arrangements, required on an intensive scale because of the dependence of psywar operations on non-psywar personnel and services, have been thus far on too small a scale to support a highly active tactical operation.

61. The future growth of psywar operations, assuming that the strategic is now more advanced than the tactical, should place emphasis on the development of the tactical side of psywar until better balance is attained.

62. In the development of tactical psywar, attention must be given to producing psywar materials of effective content, and not merely to physical production and dissemination.

63. In Eighth US Army, provision should be made for psywar responsibility at a high level, with recognition that it is an operating function at the disposal of command.

64. The audience to which US strategic psywar is addressed is of a character that affords good reason to think that our strategic psywar can be made very effective.

65. The enemy soldier, whether NKA or CCF, is of such a type that good success may be expected in genuinely tactical psywar.

66. The possibility exists for developing tactical psywar along lines that would give it the character of

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micro-psywar, and this would make it possible to find and exploit good opportunities even when the general situation might be unfavorable.

67. The evaluation of the effects gained by past psywar measures is subject to many difficulties which make precision impossible. However, it appears that psywar as conducted so far, gives far more profitable results in proportion to the cost of the operation than the results given, on the average, by other military means.

68. The enemy psywar operation differs from ours in many respects, and is far more elaborate and intensive in the aggregate. The enemy has attempted, within his resources, to copy our methods of production and dissemination. He has done so on only a small scale, however, and has in general relied upon other methods, especially agitation and internal propaganda, for which his resources are ample and highly developed.

69. The record of US psywar performance is filled with efforts that almost reached effective operational results, but which missed because the war situation shifted before they could be completely implemented. The number of such cases strongly suggests that backing by command and staff have not been adequate for effective performance, in an activity in which complex arrangements are a normal requirement.

70. Complex arrangements required for the achievement of team work by various services require definite organizational provisions to simplify channels. The simplification of channels is not an easy or automatic result of mere good intentions. It requires real attention and hard work by command and staff levels.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

General

71. The strategic psywar effort should be continued, expanded, and strengthened.

72. A tactical psywar program should be developed to the point where it can play a regular role, in strictly tactical terms, as a part of the weapons system.

Recommendations on Strategic Psywar

73. The production and dissemination of leaflets from FEC should be continued.

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74. Leaflets from FEC should deal, as in the past, with general themes that can be addressed to broad audiences over a considerable span of time.

75. Efforts should be continued to find more effective means of dissemination than the bomb and bomber used hitherto.

76. The radio program should be expanded to at least two or three times its present scope, and planning should be on the basis of an expansion of ten times or more in production of programs, five times or more in hours of transmission.

77. The Departments of the Army and Air Force should establish a roster of qualified psywar personnel from which to fill, in a systematic and positive manner, the personnel requirements for psywar in the Korean War or any similar incident, or should take measures of equivalent effect.

78. The Intelligence Group in PWB should be strengthened, so that it can provide adequate intelligence research directly for psywar purposes. This calls for a sufficient number of analysts to survey the large volume of intelligence material containing matter of psywar interest. The Group should also be expanded until it can provide summary data on audience characteristics, including summary profile data on issues of concern to enemy troops and civilians.

79. Policy should be prepared in a way that will permit any greater opportunity for maneuver that may be afforded by major developments in national policy.

80. The present PWB, G-2, should in the near future be given the status of a special staff section.

81. To secure the staff backing required for obtaining personnel and other resources, and to secure the cooperation of all other required services and commands, psywar should be given specific backing by G-3, GHQ, FEC.

82. To assure a completely cooperative spirit between Army and Air Forces there should be specific provisions for making PWB plainly and clearly a joint staff operation.

83. Psywar policy, for both strategic and tactical psywar, should continue to be set at theatre level, under the general control of the appropriate national authorities.

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84. Efforts should be made to establish between US and ROK authorities the premises for a common understanding on the values that will result from victory.

Recommendations on Tactical Psywar

85. The tactical psywar effort should be oriented toward the level of micro-psywar; that is, it should be oriented to seize upon the favorable occasions that occur on a small scale, and for short times, in the course of combat, whether or not the general situation is especially favorable for psywar methods.

86. The First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company should be brought to full strength and full activity in the shortest possible time.

87. All combat intelligence levels should be indoctrinated, as fully and as rapidly as possible, in the recognition of a tactical psywar target.

88. Psywar operations must be geared to command, at the levels where intelligence is quick, detailed and sensitive; that is, at forward levels of command in combat units.

89. The time required between the first alert, when a target has been recognized, and the delivery of a psywar attack specifically designed for that target, must be analyzed intensively in order that all means possible may be applied to reduce it to a minimum.

90. All psywar officers should have an up-to-date version of a summary on the state of morale as then known in enemy units.

91. Interrogations of prisoners of war on psywar subjects should be based on methods carefully designed to identify the prisoner worthy of intensive interrogation, and then on a guide designed for further interrogation of such selected prisoners.

92. Interrogation should be used as hitherto, but with improved methods both for diagnosing the state of morale in enemy units, and for evaluating the effects being gained by strategic and tactical psywar methods.

93. Personnel competent to write good leaflets or talks in wide variety must be provided at each point where there is a press or a speaker.

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94. The producers of the contents or themes must be assisted by highly competent translator-interpreter personnel.

95. Tactical psywar as well as strategic psywar will require research service, to provide summaries of the characteristics of the enemy audience, of issues of concern to the enemy audience, and of psywar data contained in current files of intelligence materials. On matters for which research at strategic psywar level can provide good service, on time, there need be no duplication, however.

96. Presses should be provided at least on the scale of one to every Corps, and perhaps one to every two divisions.

97. Presses should be located at points convenient to the airfields and ordnance depots to which leaflets must be delivered for loading in planes or shells.

98. Arrangements should be made for production of leaflets possibly reaching 50 million a month in the near future. This should include arrangements both for paper supply and for printing.

99. Concentrated effort should be made to obtain a leaflet discharge device that will be convenient for use in planes of organic liaison or tactical air force types.

100. A leaflet bomb that can be used in tactical planes should be obtained in suitable quantities.

101. On the present scale of the Korean War, leaflets should be produced for specific tactical targets at the rate of at least twenty different types per week. Loudspeakers should be used at the rate of at least 100 missions per week.

102. An intensive program for indoctrination of all forward command and intelligence personnel, and of all service personnel in air and ordnance whose participation is required, should be implemented. The number of psywar officers required is approximately one for each Division.


103. Instruction pamphlets, such as those produced by PWB, should be used in conjunction with the liaison effort. They should be backed, however, by personal contact, discussion, and readily available advice.

104. Psywar at the level of Eighth US Army should be the function of a special staff section. Until this

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section is well developed it should be a responsibility of G-3 to bring it to maturity.


105. The psywar section will require personnel for special intelligence, research, liaison and planning purposes on a considerable scale in addition to the resources of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company.

106. In order to provide solid staff and command support for securing the cooperation of all who must assist psywar in obtaining the resources required, and in conducting operations, there should be an officer in G-3 responsible for assuring such support when psywar has become a special section.

107. Psywar plans and operations at the level of Eighth Army should be a joint Army-Air function.

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
DISCUSSION

Introduction

When the North Korean Army crossed the 38th Parallel on 25 June 1950 the establishment for US psychological warfare in the Far East Theater, consisted of seven persons. They were working in the Special Projects Branch of Civil Intelligence, G-2, GHQ, Far East Command.

This small group had been engaged since 1949 in planning for psywar operations in case of an emergency in the Far East, and had prepared the Psywar Annex to the Theater Emergency Plan. Earlier in the year the group had been located organizationally under Theater Intelligence, and had been shifted to the Civil Intelligence Division on 2 May. Later it was shifted again, on 24 July, to the Military Intelligence Service Division (MISDIV). It was this very small planning group which was converted into a psywar operations organization after 25 June. The first major operation occurred three days later, when several million leaflets were dropped in Korea.

Since June the Branch has grown considerably. On 31 October it had 10 officers and 15 civilians on duty. By 11 January 1951, it had 15 officers, 6 enlisted men, and 34 civilians, not counting a few other personnel on loan assignments from other agencies. This total of 55 included 14 interpreters, and 14 persons assigned in Korea, so that only 27, including secretarial and administrative personnel, were available for the real work of the Branch even at this time. These people were working at the time in 2800 square feet of space, or less than 50 square feet per person, which can be taken as a typical "war agency"



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condition of crowding. There were, in the early part of January when the crowded condition was at its worst, 15 people working on policy, writing, art and liaison with the Air Force, in a room 24 by 30 feet. This room also served as general reception room. Such were the conditions brought about by the conversion and growth of the former small planning staff into a psywar operating agency.

The growth was far from smooth and regular. Translators and a few others were obtained locally through FEC channels. Other personnel were sent from ZI or were on assignment from other agencies such as the Air Forces and the Operations Research Office of the Department of the Army. The personnel arrived on no schedule and were of necessity fitted into the organization and into the space as seemed best when they arrived.

By November the Branch was organized into a number of sections to deal with liaison, intelligence, administration, operations, plans and policies, and with psywar assignments in Korea with the Eighth Army and X Corps.

The shifts of the war continually affected such assignments, and the organization of the Branch perforce, remained flexible, if not fluid. Operations in Korea imposed drastic changes in the requirements of the Psychological Warfare Branch, with sudden needs for psywar officers in Korea at times draining the manpower resources of the Branch, and sudden returns from Korea, when radio stations were lost or other commitments were cancelled, restoring personnel to the operations office.

All of this has been experienced in the course of a little more than six months of war, up to the time of writing, on 15 January 1951. The war is 205 days old; in these 205 days there have been five different periods of military action. The first six-week period was one of rapid enemy advance. The next period of six weeks, approximately, was given to hard and indecisive fighting on the perimeter in the South. Then there were about six weeks of successful and rapid advance for the UN forces, from mid-September to the end of October. This was followed by a month of vague and perplexing developments, prior to the opening of the UN drive, at the end of November, which exposed the massive Chinese intervention, and opened the last period, another six weeks period up to 15 January 1951, in which there was successful and rapid advance for the enemy.

These periods mark the turns of a war which has made the conduct of psychological warfare unusually difficult.

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INTRODUCTION

It is well known that psywar is more effective on the winning side, and the US has been the winning side only one-fifth of the time, so far. Psywar is not only more effective when winning, it is also far simpler and easier, because the required themes and methods are simpler and better known. Furthermore, psywar is, like any other kind of warfare, far easier to conduct if there is some continuity and stability to the war situation. The Korean War, however, has been subject to shifts of premises; at one time there was uncertainty for many days as to whether the UN forces would cross the 38th Parallel, then uncertainty for weeks as to the extent of Chinese intervention, and then uncertainty for weeks and still continuing as to the general policy for meeting the Chinese gambit.

It is difficult to develop vigorous psywar output, in leaflets or radio or loudspeaker talks, when the logic of the war itself has not been fully specified. It is difficult to decide how much effort is needed. It is difficult also to justify elaborate requirements in personnel, in equipment, in organizational and procedural needs. The easiest psywar operations to put into immediate effect are those that use uniform leaflets, or use radio, and which are conducted at a distance from the area of action. A hardhitting tactical psywar operation on the other hand, aimed at immediate tactical targets on the battlefield, at enemy units to be identified and hit on short notice with specially tailored leaflets or talks, is a far more difficult thing to provide. If the operations unit is not ready for this, it does not get well established until there is indication that a serious and moderately long war is involved.

Under the conditions just outlined, improvisation for psywar in Korea has been compulsory. The method of procurement of personnel has been improvised, the development of tactical psywar in the combat zone has been provisional and the devices used for getting the message to the audience also have been provisional.

The original plans drawn in the spring of 1950, by the small planning group for psywar, called for the establishment of psywar under a special staff section. This would have paralleled the arrangement adopted in the Department of the Army. It would also have been in accord with the general weight of opinion based on World War II experience. However, this has not yet been done in this theater. It was natural perhaps that it was not done in times when the need was not definite, and not done when so many needs cried for attention that only the most urgent could be met. That it has not yet been done is strong

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indication of the provisional status of psywar operations even at present.

The present research memorandum on psywar activities of US Army forces in the Korean War is the result of two months of observation and study in Tokyo and in Korea. The research like the operations themselves, has been affected in many ways by the vicissitudes of the war. Several research programs having some bearing on psywar, or directly concerned with it, have been interrupted or modified. Schedules of other researches on psywar have been upset by changes in commitments for special projects. Therefore, what was planned as a report to summarize the results of several completed studies, must now be written as a preliminary report, before some of the studies are completed. The most thorough studies of the value and effects of psywar, based on interrogations, for example, are still in progress. The basic facts on actual operations are available however, and enough evidence of effects achieved is also available to permit reasonably sound conclusions. Notes on documents and other sources upon which this report is based are contained in Appendix.A.

US PSYWAR PERFORMANCE

Production of Leaflets

The major effort of US psywar in Korea probably has been the leaflet program. PWB has produced or authorized, so far, more than 105 leaflets. This number includes the leaflets produced in Korea with PWB authorization, discussed later. More than 160 million copies of these leaflets have been distributed. They have been addressed to four different audiences; enemy troops, enemy civilians, ROK troops and ROK civilians. A summary of the numbers of leaflets distributed up to 1 January is given in Table I.

Table I

Distribution of Psywar Leaflets in Korea, July-December 1950

Target	Distributed By		Total
	FEC/G-2/PWB	Field Command	
Enemy Troops Communist Held Territory	87,526,000	15,176,000	102,702,000
Friendly and Liberated Areas	20,757,000	- - - - -	20,757,000
	42,449,000	1,472,000	43,921,000
TOTALS	150,732,000	16,648,000	167,380,000

Source: Psychological Warfare Operations Rpt 27 Dec-2 Jan.

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DISSEMINATION OF LEAFLETS

The leaflets fall into several main categories according to content. For the first five months leaflets addressed to enemy troops were concerned largely with promises of good treatment to prisoners, with surrender passes, and surrender appeals. In December there was emphasis on other anti-morale themes designed to meet the new situation. Leaflets addressed to enemy territory, with or without specific intent to reach either enemy troops or civilians largely have been concerned with information on United Nations activities or with news of the Inchon landing, etcetera. Those addressed to ROK troops and civilians have been concerned with maintaining their morale through assurances of UN aid.

Several rough analyses of the content of the leaflets have been made. They do not yield identical results, for the simple reason that there is no agreement on the way in which leaflets should be classified. By one analysis, there were 28 leaflets addressed to the North Korean Army, of which five were surrender leaflets, two being revisions of earlier ones. Seventeen were concerned with good treatment, and six with other themes. There were 17 addressed to North Korean civilians, of which four were warnings about air bombing. Eight dealt with the UN, and five with other themes. Eleven were addressed to the ROK forces or ROK civilians. There were also 14 news leaflets. The first leaflet addressed directly to the enemy forces was issued on 17 July and the next on 2 August. The first aimed directly at enemy morale was issued 9 August.

Another analysis found that 36 of the leaflets contained general information, while 25 presupposed a readiness to surrender on the part of the enemy, and 13 were aimed at damaging the morale of the enemy soldier.

Such attempts to classify leaflets are not conclusive or precise. Some leaflets are always on the borderline between any categories that are set up. It is clear, however, that on the point of content the leaflets were addressed to general targets, not to specific groups at specific times and places. Except for surrender leaflets and bomb-warnings, none called for specific action. The surrender leaflets were designed for any enemy troops at any time or place, specific only to the extent of providing Chinese versions for the CCF to match the Korean version for the NKA.


Dissemination of Leaflets

The dissemination of leaflets has been done in nine-tenths of the cases by B-29 planes, with the remaining

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one-tenth done by organic liaison aircraft, by Air Force T-6 planes, Marine F4U planes, C-47 loudspeaker planes and artillery shell.

The B-29 planes used for the leaflet drop were based at Yokota, near Tokyo. The B-29 can load 32 bombs of the M-16-A or similar type. The bomb, when loaded, contains about 22,500 leaflets, and when so loaded weighs a little more than 175 pounds. The whole load carried, therefore, weighs not more than three tons, only a small part of the capacity of the plane.

The effectiveness of this method of delivering leaflets cannot be questioned. The B-29 planes have delivered more than 150,000,000 leaflets, and this could not have been done in the second half of 1950 by any other means in this Theater. However, there have been obvious imperfections in the method, from the point of view of efficiency. In the first place the plane is meant for use as a strategic bomber. The estimated cost of one B-29 combat mission is \$400,000. It requires a very highly-trained crew of ten or more, plus fifty to one hundred ground personnel per plane for base operations.

On such a basis the leaflet missions show a delivery cost far larger than the whole cost of salaries and overhead for the Psychological Warfare Branch for the six-month period. It is perhaps worth suggesting that if delivery is worth such a cost, then the preparation of a leaflet of highest quality is itself worthy of more funds than have been allotted to it up to the present.

The bomb used is a left-over model from the last war. It was tested at Guam in January 1950, and was found to give a spread of leaflets over an area 1500 by 2500 feet, when opened at 800 feet in still air, with the longer spread in the line of flight of the plane. At greater altitudes of burst, or in wind it gave considerably greater spread. According to the best available information the leaflets will be carried five to twenty miles by normal winds if the bomb bursts at more than 2000 feet above the terrain. Under operating conditions in Korea the navigators have been instructed to allow for wind direction and to drop up-wind from targets. The bombs have also been set to burst at an estimated 1000 feet above the terrain, adjustment being through flying the plane at the required height above the mean level of the terrain, allowing a 15,000 foot drop by the bomb before bursting.

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DISSEMINATION OF LEAFLETS

The bomb must be carried inside an enclosed bomb-bay, not on belly racks. This is necessary because the lugs are not strong enough to hold it securely in the slip stream at high speeds, and also because the clamps which hold it closed are weak and premature openings occur. In December a modification was made to give better assurance against premature opening. It is known that the fuse is not entirely satisfactory, so that some bombs fail to open while others open too soon. Also, the fuse works by time from the moment when the bomb leaves the plane, and the actual height of burst is somewhat uncertain.

The first bombs used were from stocks in the Theater. Since these were small, bombs were soon being drawn from stocks in Okinawa, in Guam, and in the ZI. More recently another bomb, the M23 cluster adapter, which is larger than the M16, has been scheduled for test.

The target areas aimed at by the B-29 planes delivering leaflets, have generally been along selected sectors of the bomblines. Arrangements with the Air Force for some months specified that there would be four drops a week, and this was increased in December to a schedule of one every day, weather permitting. The determination of targets is, of course, based on the latest available intelligence, which for the PWB consists of the GHQ Intelligence Summary. This intelligence is between twelve and twenty-four hours old when it is published. From the hour of publication to the time when the plane is over the target with the bombs, more than half a day, at best has elapsed, so that the lag from original intelligence to bomb-drop can hardly be less than 36 hours, except in rare instances, and generally is longer. Under these conditions, the leaflet delivery by B-29 can only be considered strategic in value rather than tactical, in the sense that it cannot be used effectively to deliver specially tailored leaflets to specific units in specific situations, but only to deliver leaflets applicable to any enemy troops in broad areas.

Exact data on the distribution of leaflets over the target area are not available. However, some idea of the magnitudes involved can be reached on reasonable assumptions. The target area may be taken as extending along approximately one quarter of the bomb line. Assuming that the front, and therefore the bomblines, is about two hundred miles long at a given time, and that the area at the front, where enemy concentrations are assumed and are taken as targets, is about five miles deep, then the target area is about 250 square miles. Each of the 32 bombs probably scatters leaflets with fair density over a square mile. At this rate leaflets are dropped on 13 percent of the area. If the assumed area per bomb is doubled this

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would mean coverage of about one quarter of the target area. Enemy concentrations do not occur uniformly, and in some periods, as during November and December, have been dispersed in a depth of many miles from the front. Assuming, as may be quite optimistic, that enemy concentrations are present in one quarter of the area of the target zone, there would then be a probability of about one in eight that the area covered with leaflets would match the area of an enemy concentration by at least half the area of each. The assumption that one bomb gives a coverage of two square miles carries incidentally, the implication that the 22,000 leaflets are spread over 1280 acres, with an average of 17 leaflets to the acre.

Leaflets have been dropped by other planes, as mentioned earlier. About one-tenth of all the leaflets produced by PWB, G-2, GHQ, have been delivered to EUSAK, and to X Corps when the latter was an independent force. These have been delivered in cartoons, and have been distributed by psywar officers at Army or Corps level, to Corps or Division officers. They have been fired from artillery shell, which will be discussed later, or used in local air drops. The larger part of the local air-dropping has been done by organic liaison aircraft attached to Corps or division. These planes are able to make the drop with considerable precision on enemy spot-concentrations discovered in the course of air spotting for artillery, and other similar flights. In some cases, the flyers have learned to pass over the target once, throw out some leaflets, turn, make another pass, and put the second drop on the target with great accuracy after observing the wind effect on the first. The drop is made by throwing leaflets out of the plane by hand. Such a method is genuinely tactical in getting the leaflets on a specific target. The leaflets, however, were those designed in Tokyo with no such specific target in mind.

In the X Corps area some use also was made of T-6 planes of the air force, of F4U planes of Marine Air Group 33, and of a C-47 plane equipped with loudspeaker. All of these types made their drops by manually throwing the leaflets out of the plane. The T-6 is an admirable plane for the purpose. The F4U however, is extremely difficult to use for this purpose, as the high performance characteristics of the plane make for high wind turbulence in the cockpit, with danger of scattering leaflets inside the plane, while the pilot flies the plane, watches the target, and handles leaflets all at once. Summary figures on the dropping of leaflets on tactical targets in the X Corps area from 30 October to 11 December are given in Table II.

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DISSEMINATION OF LEAFLETS

Table II

Tactical Leaflet Drops by X Corps
30 October--11 December 1950

<u>Plane For Dissemination</u>	<u>Number of Leaflets</u>	<u>Percent of Leaflets</u>	<u>Number of Targets</u>	<u>Percent of Targets</u>
MAG-33-12	307,000	34	55	44
Div Organic	138,000	16	51	41
C-47	441,600	50	19	15

Late in November arrangements had been made for basing some T-6 planes at Yonpo, near Hamhung in the X Corps area, and for their use in psywar operations in the course of their regular duties. This whole arrangement was cancelled, however, because of the change in the situation.

Artillery shell was used for leaflet dissemination more extensively during the summer, in the fighting on the perimeter, than at any time since. There apparently are no complete records of its use, and few detailed and documented accounts even of specific instances. There are available, however, anecdotes of occasions when shell was used to good effect to deliver surrender leaflets to enemy troops, local intelligence having indicated that good results might be obtained. One such case concerns an enemy soldier who surrendered somewhere on the northern front of the perimeter in August, and who reported that others of his unit wanted to surrender but lacked leaflet passes. Several shells were fired, and a number of additional prisoners came in carrying the passes.

In the later months there apparently was little use of the leaflet shell, and little information is available as to results. The Psychological Warfare Activities Reports of G-2, EUSAK, for the weeks ending 31 October and 7 November, indicate that there was some use of shell in those weeks. For the next seven consecutive weeks there were no indications of the use of leaflet shell.

In the X Corps area the psywar officer made strenuous efforts to obtain and load an adequate number of base-ejector shells. The first shells obtained numbered 94, divided into two groups of 68 and 26. Ordnance in the I Mar Div loaded the first 68 on 14 November with Korean leaflets, and the 26 later with Chinese leaflets. A plan was made to obtain 300 shells and to load them half and half with Korean and Chinese leaflets. Actually only the

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94 shells were ever obtained and loaded. These were distributed to the I Mar Div and to the 7th Inf Div. The 7th Mar Regt fired twelve containing Chinese safe-conduct passes with unreported results.

The plan for loading 300 shells was never fulfilled because of the changes in the military situation. The ship Denise was scheduled to arrive with 1450 of the required type of shell. When the ship arrived the unloading was concentrated on urgently needed combat ammunition, and the shells to be used for leaflets never were unloaded so far as known.

Leaflets Produced In Korea

Ten leaflets have been produced in order to meet special needs or situations, on the initiative of Army or other authorities in Korea. All but one of these were printed in Korea, the one being printed on special order, so to speak, by PWB, G-2, FEC, in Tokyo. All of these were produced on fairly short notice for needs determined from intimate knowledge of immediate conditions, and in this sense they approximated tactical psywar more than did the regular leaflets produced thus far by PWB. Information on only 9 of the 10 was available for this report.

Two of these leaflets (PWB serial numbers 8003 and 8004) were produced on remarkably short notice. One was an overnight job, ordered by General Walker, and distributed to ROK troops on the perimeter in an issue of 200,000 copies. The other was addressed to ROK civilians, urging continued loyalty and effort, and 800,000 copies were distributed on the same day that it was ordered. These are the outstanding cases of fast operations in connection with leaflets.

The next leaflet in order (Serial 8005) was printed in Tokyo by PWB on a special request from the 1st ROK Marines near Wonsan. The next (8006) was arranged for at Hamhung, with PWB approval. All arrangements were complete for printing 300,000 copies on a power press, when the power was cut off during fighting in the forward area, and resort was had to a hand press, on which some 18,000 were turned out and 12,000 dropped. This leaflet was addressed to civilians, urging them to keep off the roads at the time of the retirement of UN Forces.

In December the ROK Department of Defense requested approval for two leaflets addressed to Chinese forces, urging them to quit a war in which they had no business. One of these (8007) was distributed in an issue of about

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500,000 copies by organic aircraft. The other has not been distributed according to latest information. The last of the nine leaflets was produced in late December, urging Korean civilians not to cross the Han River.

One other case of the use of a leaflet is known in which there is a good approximation to direct tactical effect by a specially designed leaflet, although it was not addressed to enemy troops. This leaflet was produced by 24th Inf Div, G-2, and disseminated by liaison plane. The 19th Inf Regt had approached Chinampo on the south side of the river. The ferry and all other boats were on the north side, and after a brief fire fight on the afternoon of 20 October, none of them crossed the river. Meanwhile a report had been received that friendly elements had taken over control of Chinampo itself, and the idea occurred of attempting to communicate with them by leaflet. A few hundred leaflets were produced by mimeograph, and dropped over the town. The next day, 21 October, three boats came over, contact was established, and arrangements were made to move the US forces across. This is the only known case of leaflet production for a strictly local and tactical situation, on the initiative of elements at Division or lower level.

Public Address Equipment


Public address, or loudspeaker equipment, has been used on a scale so small as to be little more than experimental. Although widely and effectively used by many forces on both sides in World War II, there has been little equipment available in Korea, and what has been available has been used with little effect, because of failure to provide adequate personnel for its operation and adequate organizational arrangements for its proper use.

One trailer-mounted loudspeaker became available during the summer. The only regularly attached personnel consisted of one technician to operate the equipment. Whatever message was broadcast with it had to be prepared by the officer assigned to part-time psywar duties, using an interpreter obtained from the Division. The Division also had to provide a jeep or truck to pull the trailer. This equipment was put to considerable use by the I Cav Div to which it was assigned, during September and October. It was also loaned on a few occasions, to 25th Inf Div or other neighboring units. Few details are available, as those given in the Psychological Warfare Activities Report of G-2, EUSAK, are scanty, and no opportunity occurred for a visit of research personnel to the Division.

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However, a note in the PWAR, EUSAK, for 24 October states that in one two-day period the equipment brought in about 75 prisoners of war. By 21 November the speaker was inoperative because of bad tubes. On the 12th of December it was again reported inoperative because of the need for a different type of generator; this had been requisitioned. In the PWAR for 19 December it was reported as turned over to the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, of which there will be more said later.

The PW Activities Report of G-2, EUSAK, for the same period, 25-31 October, gives data on reported results from the ground loudspeaker in use with the I Cav Div at that time. It states that on 22 September the speaker brought in 9 surrenders; on 23 September it brought in 3; on 25 September it brought in 6; on 8 October an estimated 100; and on 9 and 11 October an estimated 300. The report also states that on one occasion the speaker brought an estimated 300 out as if to surrender, but that they were scattered by enemy fire.

The other ground loudspeaker available was assigned to X Corps from which it was further assigned to the Marines. It was mounted on a 1-ton trailer, using a 3/4-ton weapons carrier as tractor. A driver, radio operator, and typist were assigned with it. An interpreter from the IPW team was obtained to do the talking. The trailer was available from 28 October to 16 December, but was never used for combat operations. The Marines took it to the reservoir, where the temperature was as low as 10° to 20° below zero. All efforts to start the motor to drive the generator were unavailing. Only the Marine Division ever actually tried to use it at the front, though the 7th Div also contemplated some use of it. Beginning about 11 December the speaker was used extensively in directing refugee traffic in the Hamhung perimeter area, announcing orders, curfew regulations and similar matters. It proved very effective in this work but such use is, of course, a Military Police function rather than a part of psychological warfare.

Two C-47 planes equipped with powerful loudspeakers have been available in the Theater, the first since 8 October in the EUSAK area, the second since 28 November, first in the X Corps and later in the EUSAK area.

The first plane was used against by-passed groups immediately after its arrival, and intermittently over by-passed groups and enemy lines for about five weeks, from 8 October to about 14 November. For the week ending 31 October, 16 flights were reported by the Psychological

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Warfare Activities Report, G-2, EUSAK. The plane was reported as also dropping leaflets, as did the plane later assigned to X Corps. During the week ending 7 November the plane was in Japan for a 100-hour check. The following week it was back in use, with 7 flights reported. The plane was directed to more than one target in each flight, the 7 flights in the week ending 14 October, for example, including work on a total of 33 targets. Of these there were 19 flights over enemy lines and 14 over bypassed groups in South Korea.

The effective use of the plane required, of course, competent personnel to provide the actual talks which would go out through the speaker. The officer in charge was well qualified to operate the plane itself and the speaker, but was in no other sense a psywar operator. The initial arrangement made was simply a tape-recording of a talk giving instructions on how to surrender properly, made by a member of the "Operations Research Office" Staff with advice from an officer in the Provost Marshall Section. Shortly thereafter additional texts were prepared under direction of the Chief of PWB, and still others were added later under direction of an Air Force psywar officer. The tape-recordings did not prove very satisfactory, and arrangements were made for live broadcasts, using ROK personnel or Chinese linguists obtained in Korea. On one occasion the plane had to abandon a mission because the ROK broadcaster became air-sick.

From reports for the weeks ending 21 November to 2 January there are no indications that the plane was then used. There is however, in the PW Operations Report of PWB for the week of 27 December to 2 January, a report that the plane was being held in the Seoul area, with a tape-recording ready for use in controlling civilians trying to cross the Han River.

In the short course of its use, the C-47 plane assigned to work with EUSAK achieved excellent results on at least one specific occasion. This was on 21 October, in the vicinity of Anju. The plane was working over the enemy lines, and was therefore accompanied by a T-6 and by four fighters. The T-6 saw two trucks on the road, and with two of the fighters made a pass over them, without firing. The loudspeaker then told the trucks to turn around and proceed until they met UN forces who could take them into custody. The trucks turned. About 300 enemy troops, not previously observed, then came out of hiding and also proceeded southward, and two trucks that had been camouflaged were uncovered and also proceeded in the same direction. All were followed by the T-6 plane until

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they were seen to be taken into custody by a UN unit. According to the PW Activities Report of EUSAK for 24 October the above facts were confirmed. This incident is by far the outstanding one of all reported. It is outstanding not only because of its success, but also because of the effective tactical use of an observation plane, a speaker plane, and fighters, in a coordinated effort. Other instances have been reported or rumored, in which the plane either achieved moderate results, or in which it apparently would have achieved good results had there not been enemy counteraction against their own troops about to surrender.

The speaker plane assigned to work with X Corps had no such success. At the beginning its utilization for effective tactical purposes was severely hampered by difficulties of procedure. The plane was under operational control of 5th AF at Seoul, and G-2 of X Corps was able to obtain approval for a mission only after an average of eight, and in one case as many as 13, messages had been exchanged. What amounted to blanket authorization for missions on certain days was later arranged. The plane was used from 28 November to 10 December.

The plane was based at Yonpo from 9 December, and on 10 December made a flight over three targets near Koto-ri, dropping 75,000 leaflets. At this time there were only eight hours and forty minutes of flying time left before it was to have a 100-hour check. On 10 December the generator failed, and it was reported not replaceable from FEAMCOM stocks, although it might be possible to have it rewound in Japan.

Posters

The Psychological Warfare Branch has produced two posters. Although posters cannot ordinarily be used directly against the enemy or in areas under enemy control, the operations of psywar do include tasks of information or instruction of the friendly population, and the PWB was called upon in one instance to produce a poster for this purpose. This was at the request of Civil Affairs authorities with X Corps. The poster was designed to publicize the position of the UN in the Korean War, with emphasis on the three UN slogans - Peace, Unification and Reconstruction. Three thousand copies were produced.

The other poster was a small one produced for the Graves Registration Program, asking civilian Koreans to assist with information on the locations of bodies or graves of UN soldiers killed in action. There were 200,000 copies produced and turned over to the Quartermaster Section early in December.

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RADIO

Among other work with posters there were plans for a poster series on a large scale for the use of Civil Affairs teams in liberated territory. These plans were being developed during November, but were dropped because of the change in the course of the war.

Radio

The Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2, GHQ, initiated Korean language radio operations soon after the North Korea attack. Its first program was one-half hour long and was broadcast twice on 29 June 1950, over Radio Tokyo. On 6 July there was an increase to one hour of program, broadcast twice. On 19 July this was further increased to one and a quarter hours of program, also broadcast twice, for a total of two and a half hours on the air. This schedule was maintained on Radio Tokyo until January 1951. There are now plans to expand the time further in the near future. The program content is the usual one for such a program - propaganda and news, with occasional heavy emphasis on special material such as a statement by the President or by General MacArthur.

This radio program in Korean, produced by PWB, is sent not only over Radio Tokyo, but also over several other transmitters in Japan, located at Osaka, Hiroshima, Niigata, Matsue, Fukouka, and Kagashima. The total number of frequencies used is 19, and the total number of transmitter hours is 25½. The power of the transmitters varies from 5 kilowatts to 100 kilowatts, with most of the stations at 10 kilowatts. 11/

After the UN victories in September, Radio Seoul was brought into operation again as quickly as possible. Personnel despatched from PWB arrived in Seoul on 29 September. The station was on the air on 1 October, and on 2 October it broadcast for four and one-half hours. On 5 October the schedule was up to 6 hours. Some weeks later, in late November, it was eight hours a day, and by mid-December nine hours a day. (Sources vary by some days in dating these developments, and in specifying the number of hours of operation. Figures provided by PWB Radio Section personnel who reopened the station give earlier dates and longer hours than are given in Psychological Warfare Activities Report, EUSAK.)

Seoul re-broadcast the psychological warfare part of the program of Radio Tokyo, and also used one and one-quarter hours a day of rebroadcast from VOA, Manila. The program in late December included one and one-half hours in the early morning, another period from 12:00 to 13:45 and five and three-quarter hours in the evening,

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beginning at 1800. (Schedule of 25 December 1950)

On 22 October a group was sent to Pyongyang from Seoul to see what could be done to bring Radio Pyongyang into operation. After taking steps to get coal for the power plant, in order to produce power for the station, the transmitter was made operable. By 14 November the station was transmitting 6 hours daily of the programs produced in Seoul. The North Koreans had been developing a wired program service, and some of the existing facilities for this were used for sending out the program over four loudspeakers in Pyongyang. However, all efforts had to be changed soon after. Radio Pyongyang was put out of commission on 2 December. One transmitter was removed successfully to Pusan.

The story of the effort to bring Radio Hamhung into action, during the period of occupation by X Corps, is even more ironic than the swift rise and fall of Radio Pyongyang. The radio equipment at Hamhung was reassembled and put into operable condition fairly quickly after 10 November. At that time power was available, and there were an estimated 6,000-8,000 receivers of alternating-current type within hearing distance. There was, however, no suitable equipment by which to receive, for re-broadcasting, the programs of Radio Tokyo and Radio Seoul, and it was not considered feasible to create programs at Hamhung. It was learned that a suitable receiver could be obtained through regular requisition, but only with weeks of delay. In the meantime a receiver was found locally which could have done the work, and it was put into serviceable condition. Personnel to operate the station were then requested from GHQ, and on 6 December a message was received stating that one US officer and two ROK nationals were available. At 061400 December the power supply failed, and at 061600 the power source was lost to the enemy. Word was obtained that a destroyer escort vessel would come into the port to supply power for urgent needs, but that none would be available for ordinary household use. The request for personnel was therefore cancelled, since there would have been few, if any, receivers in operation.

Not long after the loss of Seoul in January 1950, new arrangements were made to bring a group of seven stations in South Korea into operation,²¹ broadcasting programs of the same type as those sent formerly by Radio Seoul. These stations were at Pusan, Masan, I-ri, Taegu, Mokpo, Kwangju, and Cheju City. Three of these were brought into operation about 7 January, the other four about 14 January. The stations at Masan and

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FIRST LOUDSPEAKER AND LEAFLET COMPANY

Cheju City operated on only 50 watts power, the other five on 500 watts, assuming the equipment to be the same as it was in June 1950. The number of receiving sets in the areas covered, according to pre-war data, was about 35,000.

The First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company

The story of the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company is the story of why strictly tactical psywar operations have been only small scale and experimental up to the present. The FLLC is the only organization that can be mentioned in a history of psywar in Korea that might have provided, had it been fully active, a good volume of psywar activity directed at specific targets in combat.

The former Tactical Information Detachment of Aggressor Force was first alerted in August, and it left Fort Riley on 9 September to move to Korea. The group of 4 officers and 20 EM under Captain (now Major) Osgood, sailed from Seattle on 15 September. Its one printing press was in Chicago for repairs at the time. It was supposed to meet all necessary equipment at port of embarkation. It had an authorization for 3 loudspeakers, mounted on one-quarter ton trailers, 3 vans, and accessory equipment. It needed tractors for its vans, dark-room equipment, water purification equipment, and other items. The group reached Pusan on 15 October. By 10 November it had succeeded in obtaining invoices showing what equipment had been shipped, and watch was kept on the docks at Inchon for arrival of the equipment.

On 4 November it had been designated as the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company with a T/O&E calling for 8 officers, 99 EM, 3 presses, 12 speakers, and 27 vehicles. It was to serve under administrative control of Special Troops, and operational control of G-2, EUSAK. No specific arrangements existed in mid-November for providing necessary language personnel and other psywar specialists.

On 30 November it was learned that much of the equipment was still in Yokohama. Two speakers had arrived in Korea, one of which was operable. One press had arrived, but parts were lacking. The three vans had arrived, and the problem then was how to get them away from Seoul.

Since early in December considerable progress in the development of the psywar organization has been reported. At last notice the Company had about 55 personnel, and had received by transfer one of the two loudspeakers that had been brought into Korea earlier. The company was

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located in South Korea in early January, and was being brought further toward its authorized strength. So far as known the operations of this Company as an active psywar unit did not begin before 1951. Its capacity for such operations, when in full action, would multiply past performance in speaker operations in tactical psywar in Korea by a factor of ten. It would give tremendous capacity for turning out strictly tactical leaflets.

Policy Guidance

The outlining of basic policy on psychological warfare was commenced very soon after the opening of hostilities. Policy Guidance No. 1 of the Psychological Warfare Branch was issued on 10 July. Since then fresh guides have been issued at intervals, as required, with No. 23 bearing the date of 3 January 1951. An outline of major themes to be used was issued on 8 August 1950, and a weekly plan was issued for the first time on the same date. The policies laid down have reflected the difficulties imposed on psywar policy in the course of any war of limited and irregular character, in which the major powers are avoiding any over-commitment in their diplomacy.

The justification of US action in the Korean situation was based on the straight and narrow path of action against aggression as such. This has been expressed in terms of four underlying principles which PWB had endeavored to implement in its specific policies and in its output. They are:

- a. To speak always from a UN and not from a US viewpoint.
- b. To treat the conflict as aggression and not as civil war.
- c. To attack Communism in terms of its visible effects on everyday life and not in ideological and theoretical terms.
- d. To concentrate on simple and concrete subjects, simply expressed, with direct bearing on Korea.

So stated, it sounds easy. But to treat the war as aggression by Communism and yet avoid any provocation, leaving the door as wide open as possible for the greater Communist powers to back out or stay out, set a very narrow path indeed during the early phase of the war.

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POLICY GUIDANCE

Policy Guidance No. 1, PWB, introduced an initial warning:

"In using the term 'puppet' to describe North Korea, do not connect the strings with Moscow....Do not link the Chinese Communists..."

But Policy Guidance No. 2, issued on the following day, was able to loosen the policy to the extent of permitting reference to the "moral responsibility" of the USSR because of its refusal to cooperate with the United Nations action.

Other major issues on which psywar policy has been forced to proceed with great caution are the question of crossing the 38th Parallel in the UN northward advance, and the subject of Chinese intervention.

Policy Guidance No. 10, on 3 October, prohibited reference to the crossing of the 38th Parallel until official announcement of such crossing. It also indicated what line to follow if and when such announcement should be forthcoming. Three days later this was revised to permit reference to the matter on the basis of official press releases of the UN Command, as soon as such releases mentioned the point.

The policy problem on Chinese intervention was probably the most difficult of all. It was surely of the type of psywar policy problem most difficult to deal with, in general, in any war. As late as 3 November, in Policy Guidance No. 15 it was laid down that:

"The standing prohibition of reference to Chinese participation in the Korean conflict (Policy Guidance Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 8) remains in effect until specific notice to the contrary."

The first relaxation of this was on 10 November, when No. 17 stated:

"Factual reporting of Chinese soldiers in Korea is now authorized, under the following conditions only ..."

On 8 December there was issued a "Plan for Psychological Warfare Against Chinese Target Groups," which provided a general outline of objectives and themes comparable to an earlier plan covering the earlier phase of

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the war. This laid down the following objectives:

- a. To cause the Chinese soldier to doubt the necessity or rectitude of Chinese intervention in Korea.
- b. To arouse resentment, among Chinese soldiers and civilians, against the USSR and the Chinese Communist regime by exposing Communist plans for exploitation and subjugation of China.
- c. To convince the Chinese soldier and civilian of UN and US friendship for the Chinese people.
- d. To counteract Communist propaganda by disseminating factual news.

This was followed by approval of the term "aggression" as applied to Chinese intervention on 14 December, by heavy emphasis on the reported text of the Sinc-Soviet secret treaty in the Weekly Plan for 17-23 December, and emphasis on Chinese military control of North Korean forces in the Weekly Plan for 7-13 January 1951.

The themes recommended for emphasis in seeking the objectives of psywar policy thus have been in part, of quite contrasting and fluctuating nature. Behind these changing themes, however, there have been some others that have remained fairly constant, and which have been the subjects of major emphasis in the leaflet campaign, though not on the radio. In the first basic list of themes, issued on 8 August, there were 32 items. Of these, 14 were general themes that might be addressed to either South or North Korea. Another 14 were specifically addressed to North Korea and six of these were directed definitely to the NK Armed Forces. Four were addressed specifically to South Korea. The supplementary list issued on 25 October was entirely concerned with themes dealing with the UN and with anti-Communism in general. Typical themes laid down in the list of 8 August included humane treatment of prisoners, the Communist planning of aggression, and food exports from North Korea to Siberia, all addressed to North Korea, while the leading themes to South Korea were on UN reinforcements, the valor of the ROKA, and "Communism means oppression." The first use of the bomb-warning theme to civilians in enemy areas was laid down in the Weekly Plan for 21-27 August. Futility of resistance was given heavy play in four plans, from 24 September to 21 October.

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INTELLIGENCE FOR PSYWAR

The Weekly Plan for 22-28 October contains one passage which now reads strangely, but which at the time reflected the policy considerations which arose from the then general view of the situation. This passage states:

"With the liberation of all major North Korean cities except Chongjin, psychological warfare has entered the transition period between strategic and tactical propaganda and consolidation propaganda."

The war failed to accommodate itself to this declaration and the transition to consolidation propaganda has, perforce, been postponed.

Intelligence for Psywar

Psywar operations, like any other operations in war, require a variety of intelligence materials and service. For the most part these are of the class of "foreign positive intelligence," that is, information about the enemy forces and order of battle, specific news on conditions in enemy countries which can be used as a basis for recognizing points of interest to the enemy audience and can be interpreted in ways that suit our purpose, and information on the conduct of enemy psywar in terms of strategy and tactics and content themes. Intelligence is also the primary means of measuring the results being obtained by our own psywar operations.

Truly tactical psywar, aiming at hitting the enemy group in a specific place, with due attention to all the pertinent circumstances, must always rely upon very new and fresh information. This can only be attained at levels in the combat zone where patrol reports and all other sources of front-line intelligence afford the tactical operator a chance to use a leaflet or a speaker within a few hours after receiving the intelligence itself. Strategic psywar, using such more or less tactical elements as surrender passes, can get along on more general intelligence data, up to a day or two old, giving the location of the line and of major enemy units with only fair accuracy. Strategic propaganda addressed to civilian groups can also use relatively old intelligence concerning developments and issues in the enemy country, and still older and more general data on the character of enemy culture and society.

Intelligence agencies commonly provide precise, quick, and fully analyzed intelligence only for the conduct of

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strictly military operations. They also provide, however, a wide variety of source materials, such as reports of interrogations of prisoners of war (POWs) or digests of the press or radio reports of another country. Such sources, to be of use for any special operational purpose, such as psywar, have to be further analyzed. That is to say, intelligence analysts have to read through them all, recognize the pertinent items in the mass of material that is largely irrelevant to their purpose, though relevant to some other, then excerpt or otherwise separate the pertinent from the non-pertinent, and finally analyze and evaluate the significance of the selected material. The all-important thing to recognize about such processes is that they are laborious; they take work, man-months or man-years of work, as each case may require.

Tactical psywar intelligence has had no larger role in the Korean war than tactical psywar itself. So far as is known it has been adequate for the use of the one loud-speaker which has been put to effective service. No test of the possibility of articulating intelligence and psywar for fast and effective tactical leaflet operations has occurred as yet.

The intelligence required for choosing targets in strategic operations has been available to the Psychological Warfare Branch in the form of the Daily Intelligence Summary of G-2, GHQ. The intelligence required for close and sensitive selection of current themes from current enemy developments has been provided only to a limited extent, through the devoted work of certain staff members of the Intelligence Group of PWB itself. Comprehensive analysis of enemy propaganda strategy and tactics, based on current radio and press output, has been attempted, but could not be brought to the stage of real usefulness in the past state of development.

Intelligence service for evaluating the effects gained by our psywar operations has been very largely based on interrogations of POWs. This will be dealt with at greater length later, under the general heading of "Evaluation." Up to the present, suffice it to say, the interrogation service has made reasonable efforts, within limits of its own resources, to follow leads given by PWB and to obtain indications of the effectiveness of leaflets and speakers. The evidence obtained thus far gives definite and useful indications as to effects gained, but does not compare with what could be attained by modern survey techniques which could be adapted for interrogation use, assuming the necessary resources and sufficient time.

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RESEARCH

The Intelligence Group within the Psywar Branch has been able to give only a modest portion of its efforts to serve psywar operations directly. This is because it has also had to provide material on psywar for the Intelligence Summary, and for various other reports prepared at frequent intervals. These services are necessary in order to familiarize Headquarters with psywar through the medium of the Summary, and to advise higher echelons of command concerning the conduct of operations. The point is that these services have absorbed a rather large portion of the available psywar intelligence energies, and genuine intelligence service to the psywar operation itself has been far less than might have been expected on the basis of a casual glance at the table of organization.

Research

An active psywar operation, especially when it includes a radio program, requires a solid research backing. An hour of radio talk may contain as many as five thousand words. Up to sixty-three hours per week of program have been produced at Radio Seoul. Although this has used the one and one-quarter hours of program from Tokyo and also rebroadcast-time from VOA, Manila, and other program material, there is a considerable volume of wordage to be produced for any such operation. Even seven hours of spoken program a week means some thirty to forty thousand words. A more extensive operation such as the OWI radio program to Europe during the last war, might run to something like two hundred program-hours a week over a number of stations presented in several languages. Even on a more modest scale, the production of program material requires considerable research, of the kind that must be done by any speaker if his material is to ring true, state facts accurately, go into circumstantial detail, and generally satisfy the audience that the speaker knows what he is talking about.

Such research cannot be done unless there are people enough to do it, and adequate reference materials are available. Ample reference-library materials are needed on the enemy culture, on the genuine and not the scholarly idiom of the enemy audience, especially of the enemy soldier as he is, and not merely as an abstract member of the enemy society. There is also a need for up-to-date and circumstantial knowledge of the conditions of life in the enemy forces. Basic reference materials from which all this can be provided, on reasonably short notice, must include economic and social statistical sources, information on the enemy government and politics, detailed data on leading problems and issues in enemy countries,

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biographical data on all leading enemy personalities, and similar information.

The Psychological Warfare Branch has not as yet been able to give much attention to its research needs. Operational needs have properly come first, in the assignments of personnel as they became available. Research, of the kind required for operations analysis, has been initiated and has produced some results and there are more to come. Research as a direct service to the producers of psywar output is still in a very rudimentary state. If it could be put on a sound footing it could produce, eventually, handbooks on the cultural and personality profiles of major audience elements, and special data as needed for particular occasions.

Liaison and Indoctrination

There must be very few operations in modern war, other than psywar, that require the participation of so many outsiders in addition to the personnel of the organization directly responsible for the work. To drop a leaflet by B-29 the PWB has to write the leaflet, get it printed, arrange for it to be packed in leaflet bombs, and make arrangements with the Air Force for performing the mission and briefing the crew. To drop leaflets by liaison plane, the psywar officer must obtain information as to possible targets, and must arrange with the organic air control for the delivery of the leaflets to the air group. For leaflet delivery by shell the psywar officer must arrange with ordnance to load the shells and with artillery to accept them and use them on the proper occasions. For tactical leaflets, the psywar officer would have to receive intelligence concerning the target, arrange for writing translation, and printing, and then arrange for delivery of the leaflet by plane or shell. Loudspeaker operations require transportation facilities, liaison with local intelligence and local operations, technical personnel and, for proper use, psywar supervision of the output and competent language personnel.

All this involves contacts at many points. Proper contact with G-2 does not mean just G-2 of an Army; it means contact down the line to division, and often to regiments. Contact with artillery also has to be made, down probably to battalion level for effective work. Thus, effective psywar work requires a great deal of close contact and liaison work with many branches and many units, at many levels.

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LIAISON AND INDOCTRINATION

The effective use of leaflets by combat units depends much on how good a selling job is done to these units. The officers responsible for psywar at lower echelons have been officers in Corps or Division G-2's assigned to psywar duties as a part of their other G-2 duties. These officers might use leaflets if they know what leaflets exist and how readily available they are. They cannot be expected to use a special leaflet made to fit a certain occasion, if they do not know that it already exists, or could be produced in good time. Most of all, they will be deterred from taking the initiative if they know only that certain procedures must be learned before something can be done, and they hesitate for fear of starting something that is laborious and perhaps not very useful, so far as they know.

It has been impossible up to the present to provide for highly active liaison from PWB to the combat units. There has been one officer at EUSAK, and for some weeks there was one at X Corps. A second officer was for a time at EUSAK, but he was soon assigned to a special project which prevented his participation in any regular psywar activities. A few other officers were assigned from PWB for work in Korea, but only in connection with Radio Seoul and Radio Pyongyang and the successor stations.

On the basis of such scanty opportunity as occurred for discussion of psywar with officers at forward units, the impression gained is that there is much interest in psywar, much willingness to use it, but little practical information about it. Psywar officers would find themselves welcome if this were, in fact, the case. But actually there is much work yet to be done; work of sitting down with forward officers, learning their needs and attitudes, telling them what is available, what is to be done, what can be accomplished, and how to go about it.

The PWB has initiated one move in connection with the liaison problem which might have very good effects if carried farther. A pamphlet was issued, in August, on the "Dissemination of Leaflets by Artillery." Several hundred copies were printed. Additional pamphlets of the same character are now in preparation, on the "Employment of Tactical Loudspeakers" and on the "Dissemination of Leaflets by Aircraft." The first pamphlet is admirably clear, simple and comprehensive. Such pamphlets cannot do the job by themselves, but, reinforced by personal contact, they serve both to leave the story with the recipient, for reference when memory lags, and to serve as a memorandum to the officer making the contact on what needs to be discussed. In a field in which so many individuals must

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participate in order to carry out operations, and in which doubt as to the nature or value of the operation therefore puts success in hazard to an unusual degree, such means of conveying the doctrine on the operation are most useful.

Evaluation of US Psywar Performance

Any pretense to evaluate the psywar effort of US agencies in the Korean War to date may well begin with a pause to consider the question what do we mean to evaluate, and by what criteria?

The account given previously on the performance record may not be quite complete in detail, but it is probably correct in terms of general magnitude and character of the effort described. If so, then the effort has been largely on strategic psywar, to a less degree on tactical psywar, and has almost wholly excluded political warfare.

The terms may deserve more careful definition than has been given up to this point in the discussion. For present purposes, the concepts of strategic and tactical psywar, and political warfare are about as follows.

Strategic psywar is the effort to influence the mind and will of the enemy and of friendly peoples, in ways that contribute to the effort of all arms to secure victory, but without direct intention to affect any particular tactical situation, and without any such effect in measurable quantity. When leaflets are dropped all over Korea, for instance, without addressing them any more precisely than to North Koreans, or to the whole of the North Korean forces, with the hope that they will be picked up by many who will be influenced by the contents, by some on one day and some on another, over areas many miles apart, this is not seeking direct tactical effects. When leaflets are dropped conveying news in a manner which will undermine the enemy morale in the long run, and specific results are not sought on a specific day, this also is not seeking tactical results. Such methods are strategic rather than tactical. They gain results in a statistical way. They pay off in a high percentage of effectiveness over a long time. They do not, however, win the particular fight here and now.

Tactical psywar is the use of means to influence the mind and will of the enemy under conditions in which the following questions can be answered:

- a. To what specific audience is the message addressed?

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- b. Under what circumstances does the audience find itself?
- c. Where is it?
- d. What effect do we wish to gain in terms of definite behavior?
- e. What motives in the psychology of the enemy do we hope will be brought into play to give leverage to our stimulus?
- f. When?

Tactical psywar is the most readily effective phase of psywar. All post-mortem analyses of psywar operations in World War II are in agreement on this. This fact rests on the simple, natural basis that the enemy soldier is more preoccupied with the many ordinary, material facts of life in his immediate environment, than he is with the more remote issues as to who is right and wrong in political theory, or who is to blame for starting the war. Upon close contact with him there is improved approach to his real mentality and awareness of fact and circumstance, and the message to him is less involved with, or affected by, remoter issues.

This applies throughout the techniques of psywar. Great political warfare can have great effects, but only when conducted with great mastery of issues. Great strategic psywar can have great effects in the long run also, but can reach its peak performance only when backed by great political warfare. Great tactical psywar is by far the most independent of the three. Themes that mean much to the soldier can be written, regardless of ideology. They can be brought to the soldier, not from distances of miles by planes but of yards by artillery, and not by receiving sets but by his own ears listening to loudspeakers. They can reach him in the midst of battle and interpret to him the meaning of his immediate situation as no remoter means can do. They can have reference to the facts of a particular hour or day, as no procedure that requires days of time can do.

Political Warfare is the role played by the highest political leaders in maintaining the constancy of mind and will of their supporters and weakening and disorienting the mind and will of the enemy. This is the role that Wilson played with his Fourteen Points, and Churchill with his great speeches. It is the role which keeps the enemy asking, "what are we fighting for,"

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and keeps our soldiers from asking desperately, "why are we here, what is the big purpose?" It is the interpretation and reinterpretation to men of the rationale and purpose and sense of a war, and when done effectively it becomes one of the great conditions of the whole situation. It is a sort of wall of premises which strategic and tactical psywar can count upon and take for granted. To say that such a role has been played on occasion, and has a great function, is not the same as to say that it always can be played. It is certainly fact that the greatest historical illustrations of political warfare have occurred in great struggles at the stage when the "chips were down," not before. It is hard to recall any case where such a role was played effectively in a "pre-Pearl Harbor" or "pre-Dunkirk" type of period in the country concerned. However, political warfare, though related to psywar and often confused with it, is not the mission of any organization under discussion here. It is referred to here only to make clear that it is not the subject of evaluation.

It will be apparent that there is no rigid barrier between strategic and tactical psywar. A leaflet can be written urging surrender and promising good treatment. It can be dropped over all areas where enemy troops are likely to find it. If so it is strategic propaganda. It can also be loaded in shells and fired at the exact spot where latest intelligence has just given information that there are enemy elements who desire passes in order to surrender. Then it is tactical. A loudspeaker can be used to persuade a surrounded enemy group into surrender; then it is tactical psywar. Or it can tell the enemy that he has been identified, that he is fighting a hopeless war, and perhaps as the Germans did to the French, play "Parlez moi d'amour." In that case it is more strategic than tactical, and is working to erode, not to collapse, enemy confidence or self-confidence.

In all these terms it is apparent that what must be evaluated for the Korean War is primarily strategic psywar. There has been some tactical psywar, but the whole of the radio effort has been strategic and the much larger part of the leaflet effort also has been strategic. The speaker effort has perhaps been more tactical than strategic, but has been a small operation.

There are several methods by which to arrive at some indication of what has been accomplished. For the leaflet effort, there is the evidence derived from prisoners of war who, under interrogation, answer that they saw leaflets, and that the leaflets influenced them

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in deciding to surrender. There is some evidence of the same kind on the work of the loudspeakers. In some cases, where leaflets or speakers were used tactically, there are also particular accounts of incidents produced by them, case histories of the situations and of the means used and effects obtained.

For the radio effort there is the indirect evidence provided by the opinions of ROK and other officials who urge the maintenance of such a program, or who criticize it. There is also the evidence, for what it is worth, of the enemy's evaluation of this kind of psywar effort, measured by the resources he assigns to it or by his counter-measures. And for any part of the effort, regardless of level, content or magnitude, the output can be measured against the self-assumed purpose in terms of efficiency. That is, to say, if the effort is to use loudspeakers on enemy groups on the front line, how well is this accomplished aside from the effect on the enemy; if leaflets are to be dropped how well is it done; if noise is wanted, how much noise is made?

The interrogation of prisoners-of-war has been the major source of evidence on the effects gained by US psywar methods. Not all prisoners are interrogated, and the interrogations are not all done according to uniform technical standards. But even among early interrogations there were occasional indications that psywar methods were having some effect. Efforts have been made by the PWB on several occasions to get better interrogating and more precise reporting of the results and a considerable amount of data has been obtained. One series of figures obtained by the Intelligence Group, PWB, over an eleven-week period, is given in Table III.

Another report, from IX Corps, quoted in the PW Operations Report for 25-31 October, summarizes the interrogations of 19 groups of POWs, totaling 1737 men, of whom 742, or 42.7 percent, had seen and used psywar leaflets, and 117, or 6.7 percent, had heard one of the loudspeakers. In the PW Operations Report for 1-7 November another such summary is given, covering 1287 men, taken in areas where the speaker had been used, among whom 334 or 25.9 percent had seen and used leaflets, while 55, or 4.28 percent had heard the loudspeaker.

Such evidence was obtained from the interrogation system as it was organized at the times concerned. This interrogation system was improvised like almost every

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feature of the US war effort in Korea. It has operated at three different levels, at forward IPW detachments attached to Corps or Divisions, at MIS at the same levels, at advanced groups of the Translator Interpreter Service (ATIS, MISDIV, G-2, GHQ) and at the regular base for Advanced ATIS (ADVATIS) located near the main POW enclosures. At all levels there was initially a shortage of reliable Korean-language interpreters, and later a shortage of Chinese-language interpreters.

The main task at all levels of interrogation is to obtain information of immediate importance for the conduct of operations, such as information on the enemy order of battle, equipment, training and organization. Information on the effects of our own psywar activity ranks rather low on the list of items of interest in general intelligence. A question on psywar was included in the directive furnished to advanced IPW teams, but it was one which left much to the initiative and imagination of the interrogator. It appeared on about the third page of a single-spaced document, and was worded:

"Morale and Propaganda - Morale of PWs unit, effect of US propaganda leaflets, broadcasts, etc. on the unit and individual PW. Conditions causing high (or low) morale of units."

Table III

Report Date	Reason for Surrender of Prisoners-of-War					
	POWs Rptd	Battle Conditions	Separation fr Unit	Physical Condition	Desertion	Psywar
11 Sept	1013	559	46	128	196	84
16 Sept	93	40	13	7	16	17
22 Sept	155	35	10	3	23	84
26 Sept	127	31	4	10	27	55
10 Oct	567	138	19	20	86	304
18 Oct	192	68	9	5	31	79
25 Oct	41	15	1	--	2	23
31 Oct	351	84	1	4	30	232
7 Nov	50	30	1	--	12	7
15 Nov	76	29	--	2	35	10
21 Nov	63	24	--	--	30	9
	2728	1053	104	179	488	904

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A considerable number of interrogation reports are reproduced and distributed by ATIS to various interested offices in GHQ and to ZI. These are presumably selected on the basis of interesting content. They number only a small fraction of the total of interrogations. About 2800 have been reproduced and distributed up-to-date. The total of interrogations, in turn, represents only a fraction of the number of prisoners.

A rough analysis has been made of 299 of the reproduced interrogation reports. The 299 selected include Nos. 1-99, 1400-1499, and 2600-2699. The character of the reports, as illustrated in further data to be recounted, is partly explained by the variety of sources. Nine different interrogation agencies collected the first 99 reports. (TIS, USAFIK, ADVATIS, SCOTCH, G-2 EUSAK, FEAR, G-2 CAV DIV, 24th INF DIV CIC, and 27th RCT IPW.) For the 1400 series there were six agencies which obtained the reports (ADVATIS, 164 MISDI, 521 MISDI, 163 MISDI, 7th DIV, and 528 MISDI.) For the 2600 series there were 10 agencies collecting the data. (164 MISDI, 528 MISDI, ADVATIS, 521 MISDI, 24 DIV LDI, 2 LDI, IX Corps LDI, 528 MISDI, I Mar. Brig. LDI, 521 LDI.) Considering the number of interrogation groups which originated the reports and the short time which the war has afforded for generally systematizing such an activity and introducing uniform criteria for it, it is not surprising to find a lack of uniformity in the interrogations.

The lack of uniformity was, as might be expected, greatest in the earliest part of the war, and there was much improvement in the course of the first two months. However, even with reasonably close study it has not been possible to discover a date of capture in two out of 100 reports in the 1400 block, and again in 2 out of 100 in the 2600 block, and reliable data on the manner in which the man became a POW are lacking in 15 of the earlier group and 24 of the later.

It is a function of interrogation in relation to psywar not only to give some indication of the numbers of prisoners who say they have seen leaflets or heard loud-speakers, or have been influenced by them, but also to assist in determining the social make-up of the enemy forces, and to provide data which will permit some correlation between the type of enemy soldier affected by our propaganda with the types in the enemy army, and with the themes employed to influence the soldier. For the 299 interrogations studied, clear data were found for the former occupation of only 148 NKA POWs, for the number of years of education of only 183, and for the period of

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service from induction to capture of only 206.

Table IV

Social Make-up NKA POWs

Occupation 148 NKA POWs		Education 183 POWs		Military Service 206 POWs	
Type	POWs	Years	POWs	Months	POWs
Farmers	79	0	28	0	5
Professionals	3	1	3	1	25
Students	29	2	11	2	53
All Other	37	3	11	3	20
		4	18	4	18
		5	9	5	8
		6	58	6	13
		7-12	36	7	2
		College	9	8	3
				9	3
				10-29	35
				30 or More	21

Another significant gauge of the efficiency of the interrogation system is the "freshness" of the POW when interrogated. On this point the first 99 interrogations reported showed an average of 5.5 days after capture. The 1400 series showed an average of 3.1 days. The 2600 series, omitting cases where the interrogation was clearly a repeat on an old POW, and including only those for which the time was 9 days or less, averaged 3.8 days.

The manner in which an enemy soldier became a prisoner is, of course, a key point in any interpretation of what kind of sample of the enemy is being dealt with in the group interrogated. If clearly defined, nothing throws more light on the true state of enemy morale. There are quite a number of rapidly recognizable processes involved in becoming a prisoner. Out of the 300 cases examined, there was fairly clear evidence about the process in 195. Apparently 52 had become deserters without intent to become prisoners and were captured after deserting, 17 were captured in fire fights, another 16 were captured after being wounded, 3 were taken when all but a few of their unit were annihilated, and 3 more were

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captured when surrounded. Five were "lost," which may or may not mean the same as desertion. There were 47 who surrendered, for reasons not specified, and 27 who were reported captured, without other explanation. Two were picked out of the ocean after their NK naval vessel was sunk, one man was taken who had a self-inflicted wound, and there were 10 of whom it was noted that they used surrender passes.

In only 172 out of the 300 cases, was there any sort of information on morale, other than what could be derived from interpretation of the mode of capture. In a large proportion of the 172 cases the information contained was so superficial as to be practically of no value. In many cases the prisoner obviously had some opinion that the morale of his former unit was high or low, and then gave as reasons the obvious ones that a man would think of if pressed for an answer, as if on a school examination. This is shown in the following examples:

"The morale of the 17th Regt is said to be high. The reason for the high morale in the 17th Regt is that the troops are highly trained. The troops of this unit are said to have had military training since 1949." ATIS 82.

"Subject said that the morale in the Army was low because they were fighting with fellow Koreans." ATIS 55.

"Morale was low, since the majority of his company were drafted and had no will to fight. PW saw UN propaganda leaflets and decided to surrender." ATIS 1457.

"Morale of the troops seems to be very low, because they believed they were deceived by the North Korean Government into a hopeless and useless war." ATIS 1491.

"PW believes that the morale of 663d unit is fairly high, because most of them believe that they will win this war and believe this retreat is a strategic withdrawal." ATIS 2607.

"Morale was very low because half of the men were farmers from the North who had been forcibly conscripted and the others from South Korea were given no choice." ATIS 1452.

"The morale of the troops was believed to be low since

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men lacked food and sleep." ATIS 21.

"The morale of the troops was very low." ATIS 26.

"Low." ATIS 1441.

It would be quite unfair to say that such statements as the above are typical. However, only a small proportion of the interrogations bring out anything more illuminating about enemy morale. Occasionally there is a prisoner who obviously welcomes the question, does not "scratch his head" to think of an answer, and delivers a thoughtful and analytic discussion on the matter. A few such were interrogated with good results, by ATIS for PWB. (See ATIS Special Report 008) The important thing would appear to be that the perfunctory answers are useful only for statistical treatment, and are at present inadequate even for that because of lack of clarity, and because of lack of correlative clarity in answers to other questions. Only perfunctory answers should be sought from a great majority of POWs, but these should be answers to very carefully considered and skilfully asked questions.

Aside from the regular interrogations there was one other effort to interrogate prisoners, conducted by the Operations Research Office in September. It was done by questionnaire, at Pusan and Inchon. Instructions were given to get officer and soldier respondents in the ratio of 1 to 10, and not to have the filling-out of the questionnaires done by a large number in the same room. The questions bearing directly on psywar, and the numbers of answers are in Table V. Questionnaires filled out numbered 300. The answers to this improvised questionnaire are subject to some qualification on the usual statistical grounds. It is not known just what sort of prisoner of war samples the respondents were. Two hundred of the questionnaires were filled out at Pusan, and 100 at Inchon. Those obtained at Inchon, in late September, were from fairly recent prisoners, who were extremely impressed with the UN success. Those taken at Pusan were from men who had been prisoners for an unknown period.

Such is the picture given by interrogations. It is open to a number of qualifications. The tendency of prisoners to try to please the captor by giving the desired answers, was well established during the last war. Furthermore, the prisoner whose surrender is the result of many factors acting on his mind and will, is seldom a good judge of what factor produced his dominant motives. Even sincerity, therefore, is no guarantee of validity. Then too, the prisoner begins to change psychologically

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to some extent after the moment of capture. His original ignorance of what sort of treatment he will get, of what personalities will confront him, and of what sort of life he will live in captivity, rapidly gives place to familiarity with the prison, with the guards, with the general matrix of life as a POW. This all effects his memory of how reluctant or eager he was to become a prisoner, and still more it effects his estimate of what conduct is likely to get him the best treatment through ingratiating of his captors.

Table V (Part I)

Answers from POWs TO ORO Questionnaire

<u>No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Answers</u>		
		<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
7	Did the leaflet help you in surrendering?	235	54	11
8	Did you read the leaflets?	223	66	11
9	Did you talk to your friends about the leaflet?	233	58	9
10	Were you told by your friends about the leaflets?	218	72	10
11	Did you believe the leaflet?	258	26	16
12	Did you fear maltreatment after surrender or capture?	79	215	6

The question of the psychology of surrender or capture is certainly a highly involved matter of technical psychology. It is certainly not to be explored with sure success by casual methods. Questions which assume the capability of the prisoner to psychoanalyze himself, certainly give dubious results.

Two studies are now in progress, but not yet finished, dealing with the effect of psywar on surrenders. Both are being conducted at Pusan. In each case several weeks of work by specialized professional personnel were given to the designing of questionnaires with careful consideration

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to utilization of technical safeguards. One study will use a fairly short questionnaire, the other a much longer "depth interview" type of technique. Both studies were instituted by the Operations Research Office. Preliminary results of these studies will be published in the near future. It is probable that further work of the same kind will be required before a reliable technique for regular use can be worked out.


With due regard for every possible qualification or discount it remains apparent from the interrogation results that psywar does have profitable effects. The interrogations thus far have yielded only strategic results, in the sense that they have determined only how many men were influenced, and not what effect this had on the course of battle.

Table V (Part II)

Answers From POWs to ORO Questionnaire

<u>Question</u>		
<u>No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Answer</u>
23	Indicate most important reason for surrendering:	
	Because many of my friends were killed ..	28
	Because I was separated from my unit	20
	Because ammunition was low	0
	After reading the leaflet	164
	Ordered by UN or ROK forces	49

The most penetrating approach to the tactical value of psywar would appear to lie in a case-study method. The most illuminating instances of the tactical value of psywar that have been reported in the Korean War, have been recounted in the course of the discussion of psywar performance in the earlier part of this paper. To make the most of this method would require that some investigator, of operations-analyst type, be assigned to work in a combat theater where tactical psywar measures are being applied. He would have to move about enough to become familiar with psywar officers in most of the major units. He would need to seek constantly for incidents worthy of analysis, and whenever one was found would visit the place if possible, and interview all witnesses who



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could be found. If feasible, he should apply some adaptation of the "interview after battle" method of interrogation developed by Colonel S. L. A. Marshall. A collection of descriptions of such incidents, with detail chosen for its significance, so that important factors can be sorted from the insignificant and incidental, would provide a basis for much better analysis than is yet possible.

Radio propaganda presents a problem wholly different from the one dealt with above. Its evaluation depends on two questions: First, who listens to it? Second, what affect does it have on those who listen? There is no known method of getting at the second question scientifically except through sample-survey techniques, and there has been no opportunity to apply these in Korea. As for the first question, who listens, it is also very difficult to answer. There is however, a possible start through known data on number of radio receiving sets.

The only fairly accurate data on receiving sets are for South Korea. Even these are now quite obsolete, but they at least set a limit, since the number has surely decreased rather than increased since June 1950.

The latest figures that have been found are for March 1949, and these were published in the Economic Review of the Bank of Korea for 1949. ^{21/} The figures were based on government registry and taxation records of radio sets and are probably quite accurate, since evasion of payment of fees would have been very difficult under Korean conditions.

The number of sets in South Korea, in March 1949, by provinces, is given in Table VI together with the ratio of the number of sets to the population of the Province.

Estimates of the numbers still in operation are highly uncertain. The ROK Radio Bureau estimated that 30,000 receivers remained in use in Seoul during the first Communist occupation, and that 7,000 to 8,000 of them listened to Japanese stations including Radio Tokyo and stations at Pusan and Taegu. The ROK Radio Bureau also estimated that there were about 70,000 sets in all of South Korea in December, 1950, about half of the number there in March 1949. There are many obvious factors that have tended to reduce the numbers of operable sets since the beginning of the war. The suspension of local power service, which has been common, and which has affected power service for ordinary households even in Pusan and Taegu, has made otherwise operable sets unusable for various periods in various localities. Disruption of ordinary business and trade has

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affected radio repair service and caused scarcity of replacement parts.

Table VI

Radio Receiving Sets in South Korea, March 1949

<u>Province</u>	<u>Number Of Sets</u>	<u>Ratio Sets To Population</u> (Percent)
Seoul	70,132	4.8
Kyonggi Do	30,671	1.12
Chungchung Pukto	2,818	0.26
Chungchung Namdo	6,857	0.34
Cholla Pukto	8,279	0.44
Cholla Namdo	7,988	0.26
Kyongsang Pukto	7,664	0.24
Kyongsang Namdo	11,465	0.37
Kangwon Do	4,738	0.42
Cheju Do	289	0.11
Totals	150,901	Average-0.74

In considering the number of listeners to Korean programs those in North Korea also must be included. In 1945 there were about 80,000 sets in North Korea. As early as 1946 the Communists began to confiscate sets from anyone caught listening to anti-communist programs. In Pyongyang they introduced a wire-program system, and replaced radio sets with sets appropriate to receive the wire programs. The same system was planned for introduction into other North Korean cities, but had not been implemented. The PWB team sent from Seoul to Pyongyang to operate Radio Pyongyang in October 1950 estimated that there were about 20,000 sets in use in North Korea.

So much for background numbers. The exodus from Seoul in December and January must have left it nearly a dead city so far as radio audience is concerned. Half of the estimated sets in South Korea had been there. The Province of Kyonggi Do, which had a large share of the rest of the sets in South Korea had been the scene of severe fighting for three weeks. All that can be concluded is that the audience, in terms of sets, must have become very small. Nevertheless it remains true that each set may be very significant. The fewer there are the more each one will be a central source of information to be passed along by the listeners to those whom they trust, and further passed along in widening circles of gossip to those not fully trusted.

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It was certainly the judgment of the ROK Government that the radio was an important medium of public information. It remains also the judgment of the enemy who continue to send in the Korean language to Koreans.

The enemy judgment of US psywar as being effective has been indicated by both imitation and countermeasures. The use of air-dropped leaflets by the enemy will be dealt with in a later section. The countermeasures have been vigorous. Almost all enemy troops have been thoroughly indoctrined with the idea that they will be killed if captured. They also have been given cause to fear penalties from their own forces if they are caught with US leaflets. This has more importance than a mere indication that the enemy regards US measures as more or less effective. The emphasis on US leaflets given by enemy counter-measures may in fact assist in gaining effect through the leaflets. It surely calls attention to the leaflets. Then, in addition, it focuses the enemy soldier's mind on the issue, will he get good or bad treatment if captured? The whole past reputation of the US at this point supports the leaflet, which assures him of good treatment.

In general, what evaluation can be put on the effects of US psywar measures in Korea? First, it is not possible to give any precise measure of the ratio of POWs who have been brought in by psywar to the total POWs. Second, it is impossible to give a measure to the effect of psywar operations on the course of a battle action. Third, it is apparent nevertheless, from all sources, prisoner interrogations, the judgment of combat soldiers, the judgment of the enemy, the judgment of the ROK Government, that psywar measures have had substantial effects. The effects have been relatively small because the operation has been small. But in specific instances, where the means were well applied, very positive results have occurred.

There remains one more way in which to evaluate the US psywar effort; determine how the actual performance measures up as compared with intended performance. How much was attempted as against how much was delivered.

PWB set out to drop leaflets on Korea by B-29 plane, for lack of any better vehicle and with this proceeded to drop a very large number. It set out to use a leaflet bomb which by all testimony is a very faulty one, and though improvements have been made there has not yet been put into operation a single really good way to get leaflets out of a plane, though several ways are needed. It was decided to distribute some leaflets by artillery shell, and this has been done in small numbers only, and the effects have not been observed closely enough to tell what

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they were. Decision was made to use loudspeakers, both ground and air, and two of each were put into some degree of operation, but only one of each actually was put to some effective service. The use of the airborne loudspeakers which were themselves technically faulty, was never brought to the stage in which reasonably effective arrangements were possible for conducting the operations in fast, hardhitting psywar action. No speaker, ground or air, was handled by high-performance psywar and language personnel. Tactical psywar intelligence was arranged for by making it the part-time duty of an officer in G-2 in each command from Army down to regiment, except for one officer at Eighth Army and one for a few weeks at X Corps on full-time duty. It was decided that a radio operation was needed, but broadcasting amounted to less than 40 hours a day over all stations. A Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company was activated and in two months from date of activation, four months from the original alert, it was still not possible to bring together the men and machines to begin operations.

All this reflects the situation existing in an undecided kind of war, a war of unknown significance and duration, a war of less than full effort, a partial commitment, a war against unidentified enemies. It reflects the reluctance to initiate measures that might after all be unnecessary. It reflects failure to undertake the extremely hard work of organizing such a function as psywar, which requires so much coordination, so much thought and attention, so much care to get the right man in the right place with the right authority, so much need for right procedures. On the basis of literal intention little has been done. A few men here and there have been charged with responsibility for psywar, and the means to do it have been given with a somewhat absent-minded and grudging hand.

In spite of all qualifying factors and allowance for possible error or doubt, it is clear that psywar, on what might be called an experimental scale, has produced very considerable results. Whatever results it has attained may properly be measured against its cost. No exact cost figures can be given, because no exact accounting basis has existed for some elements in the operation. This has been so partly because the basis for allocating overhead costs in such operations as the use of planes to drop leaflets would be arbitrary at best, partly because some of the personnel engaged have been on loan assignments for the work. An approximate estimate of the cost of 65 leaflet missions by B-29 bombers to 22 Oct is \$26,000,000. There has been an expense of about \$35,000 for paper, and

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a slightly smaller sum for radio time. The full-time personnel doing psywar work now number about 55 in PWB, not including a few engaged in psywar research or related activities. The average number of people over the first six months, was not higher than thirty. The cost of this staff, plus overhead, probably did not exceed \$200,000. The cost of producing the actual leaflets, the loudspeaker talks and the radio programs was only a small fraction of this figure. The aggregate cost of psywar in the Korean War for the first six months was therefore, probably about \$27,000,000. That equals the average amount of killing or capturing 180 enemy soldiers. If the estimates of ORO-T-4 (EUSAK) are accepted as valid, a total of 12,000 \pm 6,000 "equivalent total psywar prisoners" can be ascribed to the psywar leaflet campaign. On this basis the cost of leaflet capture is \$2,200 \pm \$1,100 per POW. This is a ratio of about 70:1 in favor of psywar.

ROK Psywar

The conduct of psychological warfare by the Republic of Korea has been mainly directed to the non-military phases of psywar. The ROKA has not had tactical loudspeakers or speaker-equipped aircraft. There have not been leaflet drops by aircraft on tactical targets. Not since early in the war has there been any radio program that could effect the enemy audience.

However, ROK psywar has been active, voluminous and varied in its attempt to strengthen morale and loyalty on the side of the Republic. Addressed in large part to the civilian population of the ROK, it has used all known means of approach; posters, leaflets, speeches, radio, the press, and all the apparatus of domestic democratic politics. On a few occasions the ROK authorities have taken the initiative in getting out leaflets for use at the front, or for other purposes. These have been submitted to and approved by PWB, G-2, GHQ.

The effect of ROK psywar operations has been largely to relieve the US forces of the otherwise onerous tasks of providing behind-the-lines information to a friendly, occupied foreign population.


Enemy Psywar

The conduct of psywar by the enemy has been marked by his usual highly professional skill in revolutionary propaganda and in agitation. The old Bolshevik style, common to all Communist-Party dominated countries, includes political warfare, strategic psywar, and what amounts to tactical psywar toward his own people far more than to tactical psywar against the opposing forces.

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 The enemy uses radio fairly heavily, speaking in Korean to both North and South Koreans. He uses posters profusely in his own back areas and "zone of the interior." He has used leaflets against US or other UN forces to only a moderate degree.

Forty-six different enemy leaflets for military propaganda have been found so far. Little is known about the time and place of dissemination of most of them, although distribution by hand probably has been the principal method. Three were dropped by air in a small operation on or soon after 26 November, the first since July. Of the 46, 12 were addressed to US soldiers, 18 to ROK soldiers, and 16 to NKA soldiers. 22/

By far the best tool of the enemy in psywar is the one called agitation in Communist doctrine. What this amounts to is the combination of propaganda with organizational work, involving the part-time or full-time activities of large numbers of people. This is in many ways the same function performed by political party workers in the US, in the regular parties, who do the hard work in the precincts, ringing doorbells, organizing meetings, getting out the vote and other necessary jobs. Communism uses such methods more intensively than any other movement in the world today. In the NKA this is reflected in the "cultural section" which, in a Division at regular strength, numbers about 250 men, with individuals attached to every unit of the Division. The primary function is to maintain the morale and political indoctrination of the Division. There is, however, also a combat psywar unit in each such section, concerned with propaganda to the enemy. 6/

The enemy also uses countermeasures against US psywar with an intensity unknown in US psywar. Apparently every enemy soldier has been assured by his officers that US forces kill prisoners. In addition, they are warned of severe penalties if they pick up or read US leaflets. There are known instances where enemy groups attempting to surrender have been fired on by their own forces, and there is little reason to doubt that the enemy is quite willing to kill some of his own soldiers as an example to others, in order to reduce the effect of US propaganda.

One of the most novel means of psywar has been introduced by the CCF. They give exceptionally good treatment to some small groups of US POWs, together with a considerable amount of Communist talk about war issues, and then release them with instructions as to how to find the US lines. It is difficult to evaluate their intentions in this. However, it may reflect, among other things, a sincere and doctrinaire overestimate of the influence

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of their own ideas.


Enemy psywar is assisted by enemy elements on the US side of the front lines, guerillas and others. These, of course, are far more segregated in guerilla-dominated areas than was the case at the beginning of the war. These elements are used with a definite tactical consideration; they generally lie low and avoid provoking strenuous efforts by UN forces to liquidate them when they have no hope of accomplishing tactically important results. They resort to action at great risk when such action may disrupt the UN MSR at an important phase of the fighting. Roughly speaking the activity is in proportion to the distance from the front, and direction of movement of the front. When the enemy is advancing, his agents in friendly territory for about 100 miles in front of his advance, if strong enough, resort to action designed to assist the advance of his regular forces. They also then resort to clandestine distribution of leaflets and start rumors. Their use of rumors is a definite and systematic part of their program.

Enemy psywar remains, as has that of the US up to now, far more strategic than tactical. This is more natural for him, with his emphasis on ideological Communism, and with his scarcity of material equipment. Such one-sidedness is by no means a part of his psywar doctrine, however. The Russians fighting against the Germans in World War II made very extensive use of strictly tactical psywar. The NKA and CCF have used tactical psywar little and strategic psywar heavily, mainly for a reason which applies also to the US case. The strategic is far easier to organize, and is most likely to lead the tactical in development, during the early phase of any war for which the psywar organization is not well prepared.

Further Development of US Psywar in the Far East Theater

A. The Audience and the Psywar Line. The audience confronted by US psywar in the Far East Theater is a three-level audience.


There is first the political audience. This is the audience which, in China, has rendered a decision in favor of the enemy. The means used since 1940 to make Communism stronger in China have succeeded; the means used to strengthen democracy in China have failed. China and all the East remain a political audience, with the trial of democracy against Communism proceeding apace in



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 Korea, in Indo-China, in the Philippines, in Malaya, in Indonesia. The criteria of success and failure are the simple and drastic ones of victory and defeat. If one side wins the loyalties of a people, organizes the people well, directs their energies and elicits their enthusiastic and energetic action more effectively than the other side, it wins the military and political victory. So far as the affair between the US and the Communists is concerned, the Communists have scored a tremendous victory in Asia. The situation is now in a second phase, and the US must meet new problems. US accomplishment in Japan has not yet been advantageous in any strategic way. Japan remains more a commitment than an asset, though a highly worthwhile commitment even if only to deny Japan to the enemy. It can be much more worthwhile if it becomes an asset to us, as it may.

The enemy political success can be measured in Korea as well as in China. In North Korea, in five years of Communism, an instrument was forged which had decisive superiority in military power in comparison with South Korea, taken by itself. This required hard work, and much energy.

The major tools of the Communists in political warfare are well known. They use the "Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist" doctrine as a theory of the world situation, with its general and detailed explanations that everything wrong is wrong because of capitalism and imperialism, and its claims of the assured victory of Communism. Whatever else this is, it is at least an expression of a general view of what the common man is asking for when he asks "why are we fighting, can't somebody explain the big picture."

The Communists also use conspicuous works, the construction of big apartment housing projects of Pyongyang and big canals, to impress upon the people that they accomplish things. They conceal the drain imposed on a puppet country such as Korea, caused by taking food to send to Soviet Siberia, with the more conspicuous Soviet aid in planes and tanks. (This, of course, is speaking of matters as they were before June 1950.) They conceal Communist imperialism by maintaining the idea of Asia for the Asiatics, using Soviet equipment, but Asiatic manpower to intervene in Korea. They use organization to the greatest possible extent, to maximize the fraction of the national energy that is brought to bear upon public rather than private goals, to use the energies of the devoted Communists as the means to organize and regiment the energies of the inert, the neutral, and even the

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opposition. They get things done, through decisions backed by all their means of political control, secret police and purges. They use native Communists as a front at least, show regard for the national language and culture so far as suits their purpose, and strenuously maintain that their system is "People's Democracy."

The audience to which they address themselves with these methods can in part be understood from the methods and their degree of success. This audience is one of hundreds of millions, shaken out of the static lethargy of oriental culture by the impact of western technology. It is an audience for whom major decisions are pressing, as it finds its way from old political and economic systems to new ones. The new ones, however closely they may be represented in present constitutions and laws, are far from solidly built in the institutions, feelings, habits and memories of the people. The people need instruction, indoctrination, explanations, leadership. In the past decade, the Communists have gained strength throughout Asia. By this test the Communist line has reached an audience that was favorably affected by it.

The US and the UN are not without some elements of a political line. US economic aid to several areas, especially to China in 1945 and 1946, to the Philippines, to Korea, and to Japan, has given solid evidence of US good will. Continuing aid will probably remain an important factor. US policy has consistently favored the national freedom of the nations aided, and has made good on this in the Philippines and in South Korea. US technological aid has been pledged, though only in vague and speculative terms, in the "Point Four" policy. US readiness to fight for the idea of world law under United Nations auspices, against aggression in Korea, has been made good.

The list is fairly impressive, and could be extended to greater length. This being so, why has Communism gained so much? One very simple answer is that the US program in Asia, was not complete until last year. The Communists have held the initiative, and it has been their moves which have stimulated the US to develop a counter-system of international activity. Further, theirs is implemented in the full-time work of hundreds of thousands of Communist party functionaries who carry the system down to the last individual wherever they operate. These hundreds of thousands of operators work under a fixed policy, not a segmented and fragmented set of policies.

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The great impediment to adoption of a clear political warfare line by the US in the Far East, has been the necessity of avoiding provocation of the enemy. The effect of this requirement is apparent in the changeable policy guidance that has been given to psywar operations. This was inevitable under the premises on which US policy in relation to the UN, and US policy on the whole question of world peace, has been founded.

The point is that active political warfare has been inhibited in the course of the last three years. For this there have been very forcible reasons. However, the situation has been dynamic rather than static, the forcible reasons have in part, disappeared, developments have occurred which have changed the character of the situation, and these developments have been met with a series of policy adaptations. At the present juncture there exist, in rough draft so to speak, all the foundations for political warfare. There should be some foresight now as to plans for strategic or tactical psywar, and such foresight permits us to assume that political warfare may be far more feasible in the future than it has been in the past.

The second audience is the strategic audience. This consists of all those people who are engaged in the fighting on either side in a war, together with all those whose work is directly related to the military effort. Strategic psywar has to address, on occasion, the friendly Koreans both soldiers and civilians, as well as the enemy Koreans, and it has to address the Chinese forces as well. Of this audience these facts are known: The Korean soldier has had an average of four years in school. He is a man with an average of only a few weeks or months of military service. The Chinese soldier likewise has had little schooling, but he has had, on the average, a very long term of military service, divided between the Chinese National and the Chinese Communist forces. The South Korean civilian who is addressed is a man frightened by a war that shifts back and forth across his country, by the savagery of war with its massacres, its requisitions, and its heavy bloodshed among both soldiers and civilians. The South Korean soldier, like the enemy soldier, has had only a few years of school, and only a short term of military service. All are people to whom the printed word is a far less significant medium of social communication than it is in the west, and word-of-mouth a vastly more significant one. In spite of Communism and all its works, there remains an audience not of doctrinaires but of neutrals, of simple people "following their noses" through the compulsions that the day presents. They can be told

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to avoid roads that will be attacked by aircraft, and if the word reaches them they will try to do so. They can be asked why they don't surrender, and will wonder why they do not. They can be assured of good treatment, and not all the counter-arguments of commissars will make all of them disbelieve it.

The Communists have practiced for a hundred years the interpretation of Marxist principles in the definite terms of the worker's or the peasant's own experience. It remains a fanatical and dogmatic doctrine that they so interpret. How much easier it should be to interpret freedom without dogma or fanatic doctrine in the terms of daily life to those who are not indoctrinated, not dogmatic, not fanatic.

In short, the character of the audience for strategic psywar is very favorable for a non-doctrinaire line. The audience would welcome more honest news than they have had. They would welcome some view according to which the situation can work out to make sense. They would welcome a reasoned view of the nature of freedom, expressed in terms of freedom to plant their rice and freedom to harvest what is planted. They will be a good audience for the simple, practical, day to day, circumstantial theme without theory or abstraction. In all this strategic psywar can build from what has been started.

The tactical audience is the third one. It is composed of the soldiers. They have already been described to some extent, as part of the strategic audience. It is known that the North Korean and the Chinese Communist soldier is in many ways a good soldier. He will walk great distances, he can shoot well, and he takes care of his weapons with some diligence. He can fight in the face of very severe losses, and can be a dangerous antagonist. But he has to pay in blood very heavily for his victories if and when he gains any. He is a recently conscripted North Korean, only half trained, or less, bewildered at the war with its turns of victory, defeat, and victory. Or he is Chinese, conscripted long ago. The Chinese soldier is a member of a society in which family and village ties have been great forces; he is now uprooted, and has long since given up hopes of getting back to the family farm and its work, and the family ties. The North Koreans have been only recently uprooted from their old neighborhoods. Most of them know little of Communism except that it is the name of the thing that drives the political ambitions of this generation and brings about the raising of armies, long marches over winter-bound hills, and the slaughter of men.

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The results attained by tactical psywar in Korea to date, and the results of analysis of the cultural and social background of the enemy soldier, tend to confirm each other, and support the conclusion that here is an enemy upon whom practical psywar measures may be especially effective. They provide good reasons for believing that the purely tactical measures may work better here, with less support from strategic psywar and political warfare, than they would on any European enemy.

The appropriate content and appropriate sets of themes to be used in these psywar measures are a matter for continuing work. However, some suggestions can be made here in fairly definite terms.

For the strategic objectives of psywar and political warfare there is real need for a more concrete outline of conditions in the future as they will develop in case of victory, than has been available. This is needed for Koreans, both North and South. Koreans in great numbers are opposed to Communism. But the alternative sometimes seems no more definite than simply calling it non-Communism. People in any country react to talk of achievements in terms of dams and canals and roads and rents, of better housing, more education, more training in improved agricultural methods. Such things make a future meaningful. They give substance to freedom and democracy. There is, of course, the problem that the Korean people themselves must through democratic organization plan these things, if they want them. Therefore, it is the Korean Government, rather than the US Army, which should be in a position to talk about them. But the Korean Government cannot make great promises before it has some promise in turn about US aid, when reconstruction becomes possible. Such aid cannot be promised before Congressional authorization, and such authorization cannot be requested from Congress before there are some reasonably clear premises as to when the program might be needed and feasible, and how big it might be. In spite of this, however, it could perfectly well be made a matter of definite policy that the US administration will make such a request when the time comes. This would permit some discussion in ROK and US propaganda of development projects and related matters. It might, of course, become a source of danger and embarrassment if overemphasized, but this possible danger must be weighed against the equally important danger that will arise if nothing can be said on such subjects.

For the tactical objectives, which are concerned with the behavior of men in specific units and specific

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circumstances of battle, the need is to get an ever closer association in time and circumstance between the content of the psywar material and the attitude of the audience. This means using the idiom of the common enemy soldier in most basic form. It means addressing the audience in terms of intimate identification. It means sending a message chosen most carefully as one which will induce a desired behavior, and arouse suitable motivations within the audience itself, to promote action. Good-treatment leaflets and surrender leaflets are useful and effective even when they are not specially tailored to the special audience. But they are more effective when made specific.

There are some psywar themes that can be conveyed with fairly good effects by general broadcasting. Good-treatment and surrender leaflets are fairly effective during some periods of the war, if simply dropped up and down the whole front. There are other themes, of the same character, which may be effective without special relation to a unit or a day or a place. The "exploitation of patriots by imperialists" may be one, and the "disregard of human losses" may be another. There remain many which can be used only in specific situations. As one case, where an enemy unit cannot move without exposure to fire, and is open to air attack, it can be urged to surrender under threat of air attack. Such a situation can arise locally, even at a time when the enemy in general has the advantage. The threat of a heavy artillery attack can be used in similar situations. Or an isolated group can be urged to take advantage of its isolation to get out of the war, or the soldiers of an isolated group urged to liquidate their Communist officers and then surrender. Such situations depend on troop dispositions and terrain, and the actual experiences of the troops in the hours and days just preceding. No two situations are absolutely identical, and all possible variants cannot be foreseen or predicted. Intelligent and imaginative psywar can invent a fresh theme for a new occasion, but only if psywar operators are at the scene and know the situation. Psywar can make minor adaptations of old themes to fit the occasion at hand, but again only if its personnel are at the scene. Just what features of the situation will afford an opening, and just what features will become known through intelligence or observation, can never be precisely stated, but these will develop as the situation develops. It is the great opportunity of tactical psywar that it can find good situations on a small scale, even when the big situation appears least appropriate. It might be called micro-psywar.

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Micro-psywar would rest on these principles. First, it is well known that the more concrete, immediate, and specific a message is, the most effective it is in gaining attention and influence. Second, there are certain situations in war that make men good targets for psywar; they will surrender when argued into it under some conditions and not under others. Third, the general situation when one side is winning, or there is a stalemate, is often such that one would judge psywar to be inappropriate, because the enemy army taken altogether is not a good target.

But the situation is really a great complex of smaller situations. Army A may be advancing and winning against Army B, yet in a dozen places, platoons or battalions of Army A may be taking a local beating or getting destroyed. Many local attacks are repulsed with heavy casualties in the most successful general advance. Many counterattacks are successful in the course of a great defeat and withdrawal. Whatever criteria one accepts for the situation that favors the use of psywar, such situations may and do occur on the small scale even when the big situation is actually all the other way. Such small situations are small in space or area of action, involve small numbers, and last only for short times, as compared with the big battle of which they are a part. The smallest may involve only two men, one on each side, for one minute in time and a few square yards of space. The larger may involve a few men, or a few dozen or a few hundred men, and they may last several minutes or several hours.

Micro-psywar, short of making it a part of training for every soldier, will not get down to the smallest situation, but it will be concerned with situations that arise which involve platoons or companies or battalions, in areas of a square mile or so, and lasting for an hour to a day. It is at that level that psywar opportunities occur, regardless of the big situation. It is in such cases that psywar is really tactical. At that level intelligence, command, and operations are close knit, and can act fast, and it becomes possible to integrate psywar into the weapons system.

Micro-psywar will not be fully used unless its range of possible themes is understood. It need not seek surrender only. There are many enemy actions that it may be able to induce that will have direct advantages for friendly forces. It may persuade an exposed group to seek surrender, even though they may be prevented by countermeasures, but the end result will be distortion of the enemy course of action. It may urge them to surrender to avoid air attack, and thus interrupt the course they

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would otherwise follow, even if they do not surrender. It may urge surrenders on terms designed to provoke the enemy to counter-measures and not to bring about actual surrenders, simply in order to impose extra activity on his control system, and to aggravate relations between the control system and the rank and file. It may constantly seek to create and maintain the impression that friendly forces are superior to the enemy in knowledge of the situation, and in calm adjustment of war measures to meet his. It can hammer home the bloody lessons of the extravagant use of human life by the enemy command. It can hammer everlastingly at distrust between Chinese and Koreans. It can emphasize the hardships of cold weather, and of fighting under the conditions of interdiction of roads imposed by the air force. For the imaginative psywar operator there is very great range of direct and indirect devices that may be used, of tricks and stratagems and even humor that may be brought to gain varied results, to utilize enemy motives to varied purpose, and even to use his own counter-measures against him.


Tactical psywar was used on a wide scale during World War II on many fronts. It was uniformly found that the more specific the audience and message the more definite were the tactical military results, and post war research has confirmed this. Tactical psywar was still in a state of active development at the end of the war. The idea has persisted that although it is effective when one is winning, it is of little use when losing. This is true only insofar as the tactical psywar is conducted by methods largely appropriate to strategic psywar. If leaflets are dropped all along the front when the enemy is advancing, few of them reach the advancing troops. If the use of loudspeakers is on a random basis, directed from a relatively few high-level posts in the command system, and the operation is guided by intelligence hours old, and relatively large enemy units are dealt with, there is little effect on the advancing troops. Micro-psywar is no more possible with a few stations, far apart, than micro-meteorology is possible with a few weather stations far apart. It is only when tactical psywar is practiced by small units at low levels of command that it can be readily aware of the opportunities that crop up in small areas and for short times.

For fast performance in micro-psywar the many things that have to be done must not be left for improvisation. There may be situations that call for a unique speech or leaflet. There will be more that call for a variant of a familiar model. There should be ready a basic leaflet threatening air attack on an unnamed unit at an unnamed

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 place and time, and urging surrender. The psywar officer might have a sample of the basic leaflet, with blank spaces in it. The type for the leaflet might be ready for printing, whenever called for, with the spaces filled out to special order. The time from target identification to leaflet delivery might be cut by precious hours by such methods.

When the past performance and present capability of the psywar organization in the Far East Theater are examined against the types of psywar just discussed, it is apparent that the operations have been mainly along the lines of strategic psywar. This has not been exclusively so, since there has been a small amount of strictly tactical psywar, and more that has been on the borderline between strategic and tactical. There has also been some participation in what amounts to political warfare, especially in the attack upon the Sino-Soviet secret treaty. The amount of activity in the various types is not subject to precise measurement. However, of all personnel who have had full-time psywar duties in the Theater, about nine-tenths have worked in Tokyo, or in the radio stations at Seoul and Pyongyang. This does not include the personnel of the First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, since it was not active during the period covered. There have been few personnel operating with the forces.

The obvious fact is that growth has been the slowest in tactical psywar, and this is the type calling for the most attention in the near future. This means that there should be strong emphasis on bringing tactical psywar up to full-scale operation. This should not be at the expense of the present strategic psywar operation, which is far from being able to perform the full measure of its task because of limited personnel and resources. It also should be strengthened and expanded. But a better balance is needed, and tactical psywar requires expansion of activity more than does strategic. The first requirement is to make the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company fully active. This will not by itself provide highly effective tactical psywar, however. It is the purpose of the next section of this paper to discuss the requirements for making the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company fully effective in a program for micro-psywar.

B. The Requirements for Tactical Psywar. For high performance in tactical psywar in the Korean War, what is needed besides men and equipment? The requirements must be measured not merely by what is needed to put out propaganda, but by what is needed for successful results. The operation involved in effective psywar must be analyzed,



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and the men and equipment, the procedures, organization, and stages of action must then be arranged. If one simply acquires the men and equipment, and lets them work hard printing and broadcasting and calls the result psywar because that is the label on it, the psywar will be that of a team that has never practiced together. The successful effort, as a single event, is the result of much practice together, the aggregate of a lot of cooperative work, a lot of separate contributions. Somebody must see a target and recognize it in specific psywar terms. Somebody must diagnose the situation, arrive at a prognosis and a prescription, and then somebody must fill the prescription and administer it.

The situation that permits micro-psywar is a fleeting situation; such situations are born, and die, within hours. An army that could not apply guns, tanks, planes, or mortars to such a situation, in most instances within minutes of recognition, would not be much of an army. There is little chance of seeing an army in the near future that can apply psywar means as quickly and as adequately as it uses guns, but between present performance and possible future performance there is wide opportunity for improvement. Psywar weapons might well be brought to bear within a few hours as a regular thing in future actions. This has already been done occasionally. Where it has been done it has paid in tactical results. What is needed is that sort of performance as SOP across the front, instead of just in one or two spots.

The requirements, then, must be specified for intelligence, research, text production, physical production, dissemination, liaison and coordination, organization and personnel.

Tactical psywar must, in operation, be a series of reactions to intelligence. The recognition of a target is an intelligence job. It is scarcely a distinct intelligence matter when it is most immediate. The Company commander who knows that the enemy is on that hill in force may need no S-2 to tell him, because he may see it with his own eyes and hear it with his own ears. Nevertheless it is knowledge of intelligence type and battalion and regiment and Division Intelligence Officers will be involved in handling the information and reacting to it. Such information brings a lot of well established reactions in a local command. These reactions are in accordance with established tactical SOP and training. They bring, in turn, artillery, mortar, machine gun action, and attack, resistance, or withdrawal.

Micro-psywar must be based on detailed intelligence of a local situation, fresh and up-to-date. This requirement can be met in two ways, and efforts must be made to

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meet it in both. One way is for the intelligence officer at the farthest forward echelon to become educated to the nature of a good psywar target, so that he will issue an alert, an announcement that he has found a target quickly and clearly to all the rear-area points that must participate in the operation. The second way requires that the psywar operators be brought up as close as possible to the front, where intelligence is recent and specific because it is close to the enemy, where the enemy strength, location, and circumstances are apparent because he is just across the front. Much of this sort of knowledge of the enemy is never included in rear-area intelligence, simply because it is so fleeting and so restricted in value that it generally cannot concern the commander of a corps or army.

It can be said, then, that for any psywar action requiring the use of means available only to large units, the intelligence system must be indoctrinated to give clear notice of targets discovered, back through the necessary levels of command. For any psywar means that can be made available to small units, the intelligence problem can be solved by seeking real proximity to the level where intelligence is most detailed and fresh.

Content-production capacity calls for a high competence in psywar judgment as to what kind of message to use on the enemy in any situation that arises. It also calls for skilled language ability, that can put the message not merely into the scholars version of the enemy language, but into the common idiom that will sound familiar to the enemy soldier. This kind of competence is needed with every available loudspeaker, ground or air-borne. It must be at hand at every available leaflet press. The psywar function of judging what kind of thing to say, what theme to use, what detail to emphasize, how to use circumstance to motivate the enemy, how to make psywar a part of the weapons system and gear it to other arms without impeding the use of other arms, calls for men trained in tactical psywar. The language function calls for a genuine language knowledge. It is no better to address a Chinaman in the language of a part of China which he does not know, than it is to use the dialect of Brooklyn on a Texas audience. Psywar can, of course, get results without such "refinement," but its real capabilities will never be measured by such results. There are two kinds of knowledge required to produce high grade material for speeches or leaflets; they are not, except very rarely, found in the same man.

The work of the psywar tactical expert and the enemy language expert seldom gets put together in such a manner as to permit anything approaching micro-psywar. Having

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these experts both in an Army, it would seem simple to coordinate their efforts, yet endless delays occur because, after preparing a tactical theme, it is necessary to find out who to send it to, get concurrences, and send it through channels. This is not a very fast way to get a psywar idea, originating with the psywar officer at a regiment, translated into the best enemy idiom by the expert linguist in the interrogation section of a headquarters branch. It may work perfectly where the time-allowance is days or weeks; it will not work at all if the time tolerance is hours or minutes. The expert on what to say and the expert on how to say it cannot be combined in one person, except rarely, but the combination, usually two persons, must be on hand whenever material must be produced fast. That means at every press and loudspeaker, without exception.


In approximate numbers this means that for the Korean War, a dozen or more capable text-writers will be needed. Each of them must work with a very high-grade Korean or Chinese translator-interpreter. Some of the latter will need translator-interpreter talent in both languages.

The production of psywar material on such a scale will require supervision, and there will be need for a responsible officer to take charge of this part of the whole operation. Policy will be a somewhat minor problem, since over-all policy as established for strategic psywar can be followed, and policy requirements in further detail will be more a matter of developing psywar tactics than of genuine policy problems.

For any tactical psywar effort on a front as large as a corps or army, there will be a need for research. In may be quite possible to perform this on theater level. It calls for a constant watch on developments in the enemy country. The enemy culture and social structure must be summarized in a manner useful to psywar. It demands highly systematic organization of summary reference data. Psywar officers need to know such things as the average age, literacy and educational level of the enemy troops. They need to know this in detail, how it varies, let us say, between older and newer units of the enemy army. They need to know, or have available for ready reference, the elementary biographic data on leading enemy personalities, so they can refer to them for accurate details whenever they are pertinent. They need to know the major issues that concern the home population, and such items as the price level, and the rationing and price regulation systems, so they can talk intelligently to the enemy about his problems.


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 In the past much has been done in this connection. However, it has not been done very well yet. Too often the researcher has been a sociologist, or a cultural anthropologist, or a political scientist. He has worked in one wing of a building, while the operators and text-writers have worked in another wing. Although the research product so obtained has been important and significant, it has not been well organized for the need of the text-writer, and the latter has had to study the material instead of merely looking for what he wanted and finding it. This was the situation in OWI in the last war. It is more true today. The research operation is a function which needs much time to organize properly, it is a most difficult one for which to obtain proper personnel, and it has been given secondary consideration thus far, while the more urgent needs of psywar operations have been met. Really good text or content cannot be produced, however, without a sound research function behind it and serving it.

Research must work side-by-side with intelligence. Many of the intelligence records at rear-echelons are in a semi-finished state, such as interrogation reports and monitoring reports, and these find their main use in further analysis by various special branches that have to examine them for bits and pieces of information bearing on special problems. Research in support of operations is largely intelligence research, and it may well be done best by an intelligence and research group in the psywar organization.

An important adjunct to intelligence research, in support of psywar, may be the use of prisoners of war. Prisoners of war are, after all, experts on various subjects of interest to psywar officers. They have fairly recent experience of actual living in the enemy armed forces. They know what sort of language the enemy soldiers really speak, the slang, venacular, and jargon. They know how the officers treat the soldiers. They know the feelings of the recent conscript, or of the long-service Chinese soldier. Their knowledge may be difficult to tap, but the knowledge is there. At least some of them are willing to talk. Their advice may not always be good; it may not always be well intended. But it is not necessary to use it without safeguards. When they give their criticism of a leaflet, or their suggestions for a theme for a talk or a leaflet, or listen to a "dry run" of a proposed talk, they can say what they think, and their remarks can be properly assessed for the extent to which they make sense. A dozen such people can contribute much as critics and advisors. They can also serve



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as experts on a reference panel, to provide immediate information on names and dates and events and issues. Such a group might be of more service than a dozen US experts with a library full of books. It should, at any rate, be a very useful and cheap supplement to the intelligence and research resources for psywar. PWB has already given consideration to this matter and has initiated a request that certain POWs be made available for the purpose.

The required equipment for physical production in tactical psywar is at least on order, if not yet actually delivered. The First Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company facilities will increase the number of loudspeakers from two to twelve, and the number of presses from zero to three. It may be found that this is not enough. Even at present, this will provide no more than one loudspeaker per division of UN troops on the line, and only one press per corps. This will permit about ten times as much psywar at the tactical level, using locally produced leaflets and locally directed speaker operations, as has been possible up to the present in Korea. This will provide a good-sized experimental installation in which the development of tactical psywar can proceed, further problems can be defined and solved, and themes, media, and methods of operation tested and evaluated. The presses are most likely to be too few. Three presses behind a front 150 miles wide and at some distance from the front, will be located thirty or forty miles from some units. It may often be possible to order a leaflet by phone, but delivery of the leaflet to the combat unit may require an hour or more of driving time. For anything approaching micro-psywar the hours are precious. Also, a corps of from two to six divisions may easily ask for more leaflets, on some days, than one press can produce. Any occasion on which one urgent order has to wait for the completion of another is likely to be a time when the success of a precise operation is lost through bad timing. Good targets occur at such times as the action of the battle produces them, and not to suit the schedule of press operations.

Some idea of the extent to which tactical psywar leaflets may be produced and used may be obtained from figures from the campaign in the Philippines during World War II. The campaign was on a scale roughly comparable to that of the Korean War in numbers of US troops employed, and enemy engaged. During that campaign leaflet production started at 27 million a month and reached 120 million a month. For such a leaflet production the three presses of the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company may be inadequate.



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Press operations can be expedited by stockpiling. Type for certain leaflets can be set up with blank spaces in which to insert special detail about an enemy unit or situation. This can save time in writing and typesetting. Plates for standard art work can be in readiness. Perhaps half or more of the printing, after the initial period of operation, can use such stockpiled material, yet always contain specific and detailed material for each particular occasion.

For some operations it may be possible to handle some rush orders more quickly by using mimeograph than by printing. This may also call for stockpiling of partially prepared stencils, with art work already cut and perhaps part of the text already cut so that it would be necessary only to cut the final specific details before running copies.

Dissemination problems, as was indicated in discussing performance in the earlier part of this paper, are complex ones. The organic liaison planes of divisions and corps can do a fair leaflet-distribution job, but they were not made for it. T-6 planes are good for the work, but are controlled by the air force, and arrangements for their use are more elaborate than for use of liaison planes. Manual handling of leaflets dropped from planes is far from being a satisfactory method of delivery. For all dissemination of tactical leaflets from planes the relative location of targets, presses, and planes, becomes a critical matter because of time required to cover the intervening distances. Obviously, it would be highly desirable to locate the presses adjacent to the airfields from which organic aircraft operate. If arrangements could then also be completed for the immediate assignment of corps planes for leaflet-drops, the time for delivery from press to plane might be reduced almost to nothing.

Dissemination by shell will often be a feasible method of hitting a target with precision. It will not, however, be able to hit the target without also producing the noise of shell fire, and the shelling, even though it is only with leaflet shells, may interfere with the psywar effect intended, either by driving the enemy into unintended movement, or into some other reaction.

For effective use shell must be available that are loaded with standard leaflets most usable for recurrent types of situations. There must also be shell available, not loaded, ready for loading with special leaflets. The

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shells, at the same time, must not be a nuisance to combat artillery, who may have relatively infrequent occasions to use them. Any given battery may use propaganda shell only once or twice a month, on the average. If the artillery men have to keep even a moderate part of their shell supply standing by for such infrequent use, they will either resent it, and be bored with it, or will put the shell aside, where it will be less available when needed.

For fast action with leaflet shell, using fresh leaflets designed for a special situation, there must be complete readiness for loading the shell at ordnance at the lowest level where this can be done, and for getting the shell to battery. If the use of leaflet shell remains a tactically important device for psywar, as it is likely to do, then the delivery of leaflets from press to ordnance, and shells from ordnance to artillery, sets criteria for the location of presses, and the locations so determined may conflict with those desired in air-drop disseminations. The ordnance and the air field may or may not be in reasonable proximity so that the press may or may not be near to both. It appears true that pre-loaded leaflet shells cannot carry leaflets specifically designed for the specific target, and also true that to load and fire shell with special leaflets on a short-duration target will require intensive coordination of all operations along pre-arranged lines.

Dissemination of psywar material by loudspeaker will not always be possible, because of battle noise. However, even in a big battle it may be feasible to use a loudspeaker at intervals, if control of other weapons permits cessation of fire. Some sort of battlefield signal may be necessary to arrange for a pause of pre-determined duration. A total cease-fire may, however, induce a similar cease-fire on the enemy side, if only to take account of the situation. Obviously, any signal that would bring a firing pause must be safeguarded against enemy imitation, by prearranged signal to cancel the cease-fire.

Loudspeakers will not always be available for every need. Under most conditions, one loudspeaker per division may be a fair estimate of the requirement. On the other hand, even if the average need is far less than one speaker per division, there may be occasions that require a substantially greater number to provide fast action. There may, for example, be three targets on one afternoon, and none on the following day. One loudspeaker will seldom be able to hit more than one target in an afternoon, in a war in which a division handles up to ten miles of front.

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The handbooks on dissemination of leaflets by aircraft and shell, and on the use of loudspeakers, prepared by PWB, G-2, GHQ, offer admirably clear explanations of how to use these three means of dissemination. For tactical effects, it will remain necessary always to take great pains to make all contributory arrangements.

It has been made plain throughout this discussion that a major requirement for tactical psywar is liaison and coordination. The full-time psywar personnel must work with and through others at many points, others whose contribution to psywar are part-time though regular, and still others whose contributions are not regular but only occasional. For micro-psywar, company and field officers in all units must have at least a rudimentary acquaintance with psywar. They must know what operation can be called for, and whom to call. They must be acquainted with the variety of possible means. They must know what main types of leaflets and loudspeaker talks are possible, how they can be fitted to the situation, what details are needed to make them most effective. And they must know enough of psywar tactics to know a good situation when they see one, how to call on psywar and count upon it, and how to adjust their use of other weapons so that the psywar at the moment of delivery will fit into the entire action in an effective way.

Micro-psywar is impossible without reliance upon company and field officers. Only they are close enough to battle, and uniformly distributed enough, to see the psywar situations that arise in the course of the main action. They can best alert the psywar apparatus, and furnish the detail which makes the psywar instrument a precision instrument, providing the data by which the content of the leaflet will be directed to some specific unit of the CCF or NKA, instead of to the general body of the CCF or NKA. Only they can direct the action of the loudspeaker, or fire the shell, at the proper time and place. They alone can make command decisions of truly tactical character, for psywar as for any other kind of weapon.

In order that the men concerned may play the role required they must be given effective indoctrination. They will not get it from a mere circular of instruction; any instruction on paper gives rise to questions. It gets read more or less well. However, if it is delivered by a psywar officer, who stays to discuss it, it can be transformed into a real reference paper that later serves to assist memory. Specimen leaflets become reference samples when they have been discussed with somebody, whereas they would be a part of a dead file otherwise. The important

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thing that a liaison officer can do, and that papers cannot, is be present and wait for a free hour when the attention of the field or company officer can be had. The paper arrives, as likely as not, at the time when attention cannot be given, and has to find its way to attention later among many competitors. Psywar must become a part of doctrine at the combat level, before it can reach full use or effect. It can become so only if the process of indoctrination is actually performed. That requires salesmanship and discussion. It means holding conferences on psywar with divisions that have had considerable experience with it, when such divisions have the opportunity, and it requires that there be seminars for officers concerned or interested.

There must also be organizational arrangements. The use of tactical psywar in Korea, so far has been on such a small scale that all arrangements have been ad hoc rather than general. Psywar as a regular element in tactics requires that arrangements be on a standing basis with all ordnance teams for loading leaflet shell, with all organic liaison aircraft to deliver the leaflets with all intelligence officers to recognize targets, and with all concerned to execute their assignments on the psywar team whenever a psywar action is initiated.

Such liaison and coordination efforts require work; they cannot be done "with mirrors." The psywar team at the Army level must have a sufficient staff of psywar officers to reach all units often enough to be well acquainted. This probably requires at least one psywar officer for each division. The psywar officers must make the contacts for the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, and make other necessary arrangements. They must be ready to assist a local commander in planning a psywar operation whenever it calls for any special treatment.

To control and direct the complex activity of tactical psywar there must be a strong organizational link to Army Headquarters. Probably this should, as a general thing, be a special staff section. However, in its initial phases, as was found useful in D/A itself, this special staff section probably should be started and nursed along as a G-3 section, until strong enough in personnel to go its own way. This section has much to supervise and organize beside the Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. It has to arrange and coordinate all the operations of others who must participate. It must supervise the genuine articulation of all the parts of the psywar machine. It must become proficient in such arrangements, and in knowing the criteria of timing and performance, until

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the psywar operations can be performed with precision and effect. For tactical psywar, the chief psywar officer in the Army must understand that his job is something like that of a football coach, which requires continual effort to develop team work, to get perfection in the execution of assignments, and split-second provision in timing. He can do only part of this by giving orders, and therefore he must also cajole, exhort and browbeat. A man must be found who can do this with at least as much nerve and energy as a successful football coach gives to his job.

Effective staff backing will remain necessary even if psywar grows to the status of a special staff section. If it is to be fully integrated into the weapons system it must always be included in G-3 considerations and plans. This means that G-3 will remain the focus of responsibility for seeing to it that psywar is capable of performing up to expectation. Therefore, even though psywar becomes a special staff section, it should nevertheless remain a concern of G-3. The G-3 should have one officer assigned specifically to psywar duties. He should do two things: (a) fully represent psywar in the planning process; and (b) see to it that psywar has adequate support in all matters of coordination and of service by other staff sections and by all Army services.

C. The Future of Strategic Psywar in the Korean War
The program of the Psychological Warfare Branch at GHQ in Tokyo will, of course, be affected somewhat by the development of a strong tactical psywar program, if such a development actually is consummated. But the affect will not be great.

It was explained earlier, in discussion of psywar performance in the first six months of the Korean War, that the psywar operation thus far had been very largely strategic. Tactical psywar should supplement this, not in any sense to replace it. Although strategic psywar has been required in the past to perform some tactical functions, it should be relieved of this fringe of irregular minor tasks. The development of tactical psywar on a micro-psywar basis in the combat zone should affect strategic psywar mainly by making its task clearly and strictly strategic in level and scope.

This would not eliminate any present function of PWB so far as can be foreseen. The types of leaflets produced and distributed from Tokyo should remain the same. Surrender passes and good-treatment leaflets are two of these. Bomb warnings to civilians in areas subject to strategic bombing are obviously appropriate for distribution

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by strategic aircraft. A good and effective news-sheet series might also be developed and made part of the strategic operation, on the model of some of those that were most effective in the last war. The main effect on the leaflet program of PWB that would arise from a strong tactical operation would be a reduced requirement for strategic leaflets for tactical use. Even here there might be no great change, since the strategic leaflet will remain the handiest emergency supply when a special leaflet cannot be produced on time. The division of labor on leaflets as between Army and GHQ, may perhaps be indicated by the relative quantities that might be printed, with some such number as 1,000,000 per mission of tactical leaflets prepared by Army and any larger number of strategic leaflets prepared by GHQ for a given situation.

The radio operation of PWB is still only the nucleus of the sort of operation that may be required. It is not the function of this paper to lay down the premises as to the future of the Far Eastern situation, yet any plans for the future of the radio operation must be based on some such premises. It may be that in a year the radio operation in PWB will have to grow, from an operation involving seven small stations in Korea, producing from one to two hours of program a day, to something ten or twenty times as large. This will not, of course, demand twenty times as many stations, though it may well require much more than twenty times as much power output. There may also be necessary an increase in the number of languages used. If, as appears quite possible at present (22 January), the policy of the US in the Far East, and the relation of this policy to the United Nations, becomes clearer during 1951 than it has been for the last five years, then strategic psywar by radio will become far more feasible to conduct in an effective way. PWB should plan for a big future in this respect. It should be encouraged to do so by higher authorities and, with all due regard for economy and for moderation in advance of firm premises, it should be allowed to increase its growth in recruitment, organization, space and equipment, against future need, before emergencies become actual.

Comparative data on Communist-controlled and US-controlled radio operations addressed to the Far East follows. 11/ The US data include programs from ZI and other areas, not simply the PWB programs in Japan and Korea.

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Table VII

Comparative Data on Communist
and US Radio Operations in the Far East

Program Details	Communist	US-Controlled
Total Daily Hours	386	66
Stations	84	19
Languages	20	10
Frequencies	143	47

Research and intelligence on the enemy culture, psychology, economics, politics, sociology, and events and issues has, as explained earlier, only been started. A great deal of this sort of research, including the analysis of mass intelligence materials for data pertinent to psywar, should be done at Tokyo. Tactical psywar should depend on Tokyo for this, and the basic reference material should be analysed for the use of both strategic and tactical psywar operations.

One measure that it may be important for PWB to develop is a more specialized procedure for interrogation of newly-captured prisoners of war for psywar purposes. Such interrogations will remain an important source of data for two purposes: (a) to measure the state of enemy morale, and (b) to measure the effects that psywar output, especially the strategic output, is having on the enemy. A measurement of the effect of genuinely tactical psywar will probably be obtained best from reports of actual incidents which specify the operational results attained. For strategic psywar however, which depends on cumulative effects from all psywar measures, the best evidence will always be statistical.

Two things are needed for successful interrogations for psywar purposes. The first is an adequate method of identifying the prisoner who is worth interrogating on psywar at some length. The second is a very carefully considered questionnaire with ample latitude allowed in certain of the questions to meet the needs of special lines of questioning. It may be possible to provide a questionnaire which regular interrogation teams can handle effectively and without undue burden. To prepare such a questionnaire would require however, months of good hard work by someone with good professional competence both in psywar and in interrogation techniques.

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FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF US PSYWAR

The task of defining psywar policy may become a far more demanding one than it has been thus far. If the radio program, for example, were to grow into something like fifty hours a day of programs from several stations, then the interest of the Department of State, and quite likely the interest of Congress also, would become lively and immediate, and the definition of policy would become a much more complex process.

The Psychological Warfare Branch was born, and has grown thus far, as a branch within the Military Intelligence Services Division. It was a good arrangement at the start to have it placed in the organization of GHQ in some such fashion. Until an organization is large enough to develop a fairly complex set of functions, and to have its own personnel and administrative services, it can grow most easily under the aegis of a strong and well established organization. But psywar is not in any literal sense a "military intelligence service." It is a strategic and tactical operation. It cannot, in the long run, be brought to full effect under the control of authorities whose major responsibilities are concerned with entirely different functions. Once psywar is well built up and active on a large scale it becomes one of the resources at the disposition of operational command, and it should not be placed in the structure of the organization at a point remote from command. This is most especially true because its effectiveness depends so much upon the participation of many who are not regular members of its own organization, and this participation cannot be brought to perfection without command support.

If the psywar function in GHQ continues to grow in size and activity, therefore, it should probably be given some fresh status. The basic solution adopted in the Department of the Army is to make psywar a special staff agency. This has much to recommend it. Since such a solution was recommended in this Theater before the beginning of the Korean War, the question should be given full consideration; has the time not come, or is it not approaching, when psywar should be given such status or some alternative fresh status in GHQ, Far East Command?

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APPENDIX A

Bibliography and Sources

REMARKS

This memorandum on psywar activities in the Korean War is based upon about two months of work in the Far East Theater. During these two months the author had access to documents and records of the Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2, GHQ, FEC, and was able to meet and discuss psywar matters with all members of the staff of the Branch including its Chief, Mr. J. Woodall Greene. Three weeks were spent in Korea, partly in discussing the direction of research effort of other "Operations Research" personnel concerned with psywar, partly in direct contacts with psywar officers and with others in various units of Eighth Army who had some knowledge of psywar operations.

All concerned have been completely cooperative in providing data necessary for this memorandum, their courtesy and eagerness to assist have been greatly appreciated.

In addition to furnishing access to records and documents, and giving freely of time for inquiry and discussion, members of the Psychological Warfare Branch also reviewed the portion of this memorandum dealing with past performance in the US psywar effort, and made helpful suggestions in regard to descriptive detail. As usual in such acknowledgments, it should be added that none of those who assisted the author is responsible for the interpretations or conclusions drawn from the facts.

It was originally intended that the study covered by this memorandum would fully reflect the results of several other psywar studies and research programs. Because of various exigencies arising out of shifts of the war the other studies have not yet been completed, while this one cannot be delayed. The titles of such studies are included in the following bibliography, however, since there are points in this memorandum which rest upon their findings.

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UNCOMPLETED STUDIES

International Public Opinion Research Incorporated, under contract with the Operations Research Office, Department of the Army, is conducting a survey relating to the effectiveness of psywar, through interrogations of prisoners of war. A preliminary report on this should become available in February 1951, as an ORO memorandum submitted to EUSAK.

Another investigation, also based upon interrogations, is being conducted by Dr. Lessing Kahn of the Operations Research Office. It will deal with the technical psychological effects of psywar. It should be completed

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during February 1951, and will be the subject of an ORO memorandum submitted to EUSAK.

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
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